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REDIRECTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY: 
NON-ESSENTIAL SPENDING 
AS POLITICAL SPEECH 
STEPHANIE R. HOFFER* 
Direct voting on taxes and spending have created an imbalance 
between direct democracy and representative democracy at local levels of 
government.  Overreach by voters, unable to engage in debate and 
compromise, can force representatives into defensive and suboptimal 
decision-making, resulting in either underproduction or overproduction 
of certain public goods.  As a consequence, some scholars have called for 
extreme limitation, or even abolition, of direct democracy in tax and 
spending decisions.  This need not be the solution.  Empirical studies of 
human behavior suggest that channeling direct democratic decision-
making would produce results superior to those of limitation or abolition.  
Building a bridge between representative and direct democratic processes, 
even with regard to relatively inconsequential subject matters, would 
provide representative government with valuable information about 
constituent attitudes and preferences while fostering constituent 
cooperation in the provision of public goods.  Specifically, this Article 
proposes preservation of existing direct democratic mechanisms while 
permitting constituents to opt out of payments for particular non-essential 
public goods chosen by the representative government on the basis of 
established criteria.  Such a system would lessen the likelihood of overt 
tax revolt by giving a voice to all constituents, even those who decline to 
proactively engage in political speech, satisfying libertarian preferences of 
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some while creating feedback on shared cooperation among others. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The provision of essential public goods such as roads, schools, and 
emergency services is unquestionably within the authority of local 
governments.1  The public mandate for these goods is widely recognized, 
and their basic availability at the local level is non-negotiable.  It is not 
surprising, then, that elected representatives raise revenue for essential 
goods through mandatory, broad-based taxes such as sales, income, and 
real property taxes.2  Provision of these goods is unlikely to induce 
constituent revolt because constituents’ aggregate preferences for them 
are likely to be closely aligned with elected representatives’ preferences, 
if not in quality, then at least in kind.  The same alignment may not hold 
true, however, for the provision of non-essential public goods, which are 
nonetheless frequently financed with mandatory broad-based taxes.  
Furthermore, using revenue from broad-based taxes to provide these 
 
1. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 19 (6th ed. 2006) (describing various forms of local government and noting 
that municipalities “dominate local government expenditure on highways, police and fire 
protection, parking, libraries, housing and urban redevelopment, and sewerage and 
sanitation”). 
2. See id. at 295, 337, 349, 363 (describing property taxes, income taxes, use charges, sales 
taxes, and lotteries as ways in which municipalities raise revenue). 
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goods may increase the potential for constituent revolt through voter 
enactment of limitations on government tax and spending powers.  
Consequently, a representative government’s choice to provide non-
essential public goods creates an opportunity to address the sometimes 
volatile relationship between those governments and their constituents. 
Addressing this relationship is both necessary and timely in light of 
state and local revenue shortfalls arising in the wake of the Great 
Recession.3  Beginning with the recession of the 1970s and continuing 
through today, direct voting on taxes and spending has created an 
imbalance between direct democracy and representative democracy at 
the local level.  Overreach by voters, unable to engage in debate and 
compromise, can force representatives into defensive and suboptimal 
decision-making, resulting in either underproduction or overproduction 
of certain public goods.  As a consequence, some scholars have called 
for extreme limitation, or even abolition, of direct democracy in tax and 
spending decisions.4  This need not be the solution.  Empirical studies of 
human behavior suggest that channeling direct democratic decision-
making would produce results superior to those of limitation or 
abolition.5  Building a bridge between representative and direct 
democratic processes, even with regard to relatively inconsequential 
matters, would generate information about constituent preferences 
while fostering constituent cooperation in the provision of public goods.  
This Article proposes preservation of existing direct democratic 
mechanisms while permitting constituents to opt out of payments for 
particular non-essential public goods chosen by the representative 
government.  Doing so would lessen the likelihood of direct democratic 
revolt by giving voice to all constituents, even those who decline to 
proactively engage in political speech.  In addition, it would foster 
demonstrated cooperation among some constituents, a condition that 
behavioral science has shown to be contagious.6 
In support of this proposal, Part II of the Article will describe the 
 
3. See Michael Booth, Loss of City Services: Springs Lays Bare Its Budget Woes in 
Painful Cuts, DENVER POST, Jan. 31, 2010, at 1A (discussing local government cuts to basic 
services due to revenue shortfalls); Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., America Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 9, 2010, at A19 (same). 
4. See infra Part II.C. 
5. See infra Parts II.D, V.E. 
6. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 616 (2000) [hereinafter Kahan, Gentle Nudges]. 
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current imbalance between direct and representative democratic 
decision-making on tax and spending issues by local government.7  
Specifically, it will argue that current forms of democratic decision-
making should be preserved as an important check on representative 
government, but that constituents’ impulse to overreach through the use 
of existing direct democratic mechanisms could be more constructively 
channeled through increased interaction between the representative and 
direct democratic processes.  Part III will argue that local governments 
could accomplish this goal by selecting certain recurring non-capital, 
non-essential expenses and allowing constituents to opt out of paying 
their share.  This new form of direct democracy could take as its starting 
point an opt-out tax employed by religious congregations in Germany, 
which allows constituents to exit on a rolling basis rather than requiring 
a one-time vote.8  An opt-out is preferable to an opt-in, I argue, because 
in the absence of bureaucratic barriers, constituents who are unable to 
overcome stickiness of the default option generally will not have strong 
preferences about the expenses up for debate.  This lack of strong 
preferences justifies a presumption in favor of the representative 
government.  For that reason, an opt-out is preferable to an opt-in.  In 
Part IV, the Article identifies potential problems and proposes 
structural solutions for them, focusing particularly on the criticism that 
proportional decision-making by the populace produces results that are 
not consonant with public choice.  Part V describes benefits arising from 
the model, including increased consensus among constituents, and Part 
VI concludes this Article. 
II.  IMBALANCE IN DIRECT AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND 
TAXES 
A.  Why Should We Care About Decisions Made by Local Governments? 
Although decision-making by one locality may seem to have little 
 
7. In this context, “direct democracy” refers to political decision-making processes, such 
as the ballot initiative and the referendum, that are used by constituents to directly affect 
outcomes.  Dale A. Oesterle, Ballot Measures: Initiatives and Referendums, ELECTION 
LAW @ MORITZ (Nov. 10, 2004), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ebook/part7/elections_
direct02.html.  In contrast, as used in this Article, “representative democracy” refers to 
governance by elected representatives.  See id. 
8. Stephanie R. Hoffer, Caesar as God’s Banker: Using Germany’s Church Tax as an 
Example of Non-Geographically Bounded Taxing Jurisdiction, 9 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. 
REV. 595, 604–06 (2010). 
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effect on the country as a whole, and therefore may seem to be of little 
consequence, the aggregate impact of local governments is impressive.  
The political magnitude of money raised, borrowed, and spent by local 
governments cannot be overstated.  Nonetheless, the question of 
whether and how representative governments should share their 
decision-making power with constituents has not yet been fully 
answered.9  Although the so-called tax revolt of the 1970s produced a 
rich literature on the propriety of California’s tax-limiting Proposition 
13 and similar pronouncements, scholars of direct democracy and taxes 
have primarily focused on ballot-box voting by constituents.10  A second 
form of direct democracy—proportionate decision-making—has 
generated very little discussion.11  I seek to fill this gap by introducing a 
new element to the direct democracy tax debate: an opt-out system of 
funding for selected non-essential public goods that will allow 
constituents to collaborate with the representative government and 
engage in political speech through proportionate decision-making. 
Before discussing the proposal in earnest, it is useful to consider 
some general information about local governments and their spending 
habits.  The United States has a jaw-dropping array of local government 
institutions.  Counties, cities, school districts, fire departments, utilities, 
and countless other special purpose districts are permitted to levy taxes 
and issue bonds.12  The 2002 census counted more than eighty-seven 
 
9. Although many articles address the question of direct democratic decision-making, 
few have squarely addressed the great potential for interrelationship between the direct 
democratic process and the representative process.  For a useful foray into this area, see Kirk 
J. Stark, The Right to Vote on Taxes, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 191 (2001). 
10. See ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT, HOW PROPERTY 
TAX TRANSFORMED AMERICAN POLITICS 14 (2008) (noting that popular referendum was a 
watershed moment in tax politics); Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an 
enormous literature.”).  For two examples of this, see William A. Fischel, Did John Serrano 
Vote for Proposition 13? A Reply to Stark and Zasloff’s “Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did 
Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?,” 51 UCLA L. REV. 887 (2004); and Kirk Stark & 
Jonathan Zasloff, Tiebout and Tax Revolts: Did Serrano Really Cause Proposition 13?, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 801 (2003). 
11. For two articles discussing proportional tax voting, see Saul Levmore, Taxes as 
Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387 (1998); and Nancy C. Staudt, Taxation Without 
Representation, 55 TAX L. REV. 555 (2002). 
12. For instance, in addition to counties and municipalities, the State of New York has 
public authorities for parks, highways, bridges, tunnels, markets, public utilities, ports, 
parking, science and technology, health care, and local government assistance.  See N.Y. PUB. 
AUTH. LAW §§ 150–471, 525–734, 825–893, 1000–1348, 1350–1399, 1400–1621, 3001–3040, 
3100–3109 (Consol. 2010).  And this does not include the usual plethora of fire, water, and 
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thousand such entities.13  These entities spent in excess of $2.3 trillion in 
2004, which was approximately 19% of the U.S. GDP.14  The enormity of 
this expense justifies a deeper inquiry into the direct and representative 
democratic processes through which localities raise and spend revenue.  
This task is made difficult by the practically non-existent definition of 
“local government” and the variety of entities that this loose term 
encompasses.  I readily acknowledge that not all local government 
entities can, or should, adopt an opt-out system to finance certain non-
essential goods;15 however, the sheer enormity of the task makes it 
impossible to address each form of entity individually.  Consequently, I 
will use the term “local government” to refer to those entities with 
broadly defined general responsibilities, such as municipalities and 
counties. 
Local governments usually raise revenue through a combination of 
taxation, fee-for-use charges, and borrowing.16  Taxes are generally 
thought of as costs imposed on all taxpayers within a local government’s 
jurisdiction for purposes of covering the government’s expenses.17  They 
are imposed without regard to the particular benefit received by any 
individual payor, and instead are regarded as contributions to the 
general welfare of all.18  Taxes may take a variety of forms, but property 
and sales taxes are most common at the local level.19  In addition, a few 
states allow local governments to levy income taxes.20  Local 
 
school districts that work side by side with most municipalities.  See MANDELKER ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 17–22 (describing a variety of local, non-municipal government entities).  
13. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE 2008 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 261 (2008), available at 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2008/2008edition.html; see also Akash Deep & 
Robert Lawrence, Stabilizing State and Local Budgets: A Proposal for Tax-Base Insurance 7 
(The Hamilton Project Discussion Paper No. 2008-1), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/06_tax_base_lawrence/06_tax_base_la
wrence.pdf.  
14. See Deep & Lawrence, supra note 13, at 6. 
15. For instance, it is not clear that government entities with narrowly defined missions 
will have non-essential expenses eligible for inclusion in the proposed funding structure.  
Furthermore, use of the structure by a multitude of entities with overlapping geographical 
jurisdictions may result both in constituent confusion and voter fatigue. 
16. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 256–57 (describing local finance as a 
combination of taxes and borrowing). 
17. Laurie Reynolds, Taxes, Fees, Assessments, Dues, and the “Get What You Pay For” 
Model of Local Government, 56 FLA. L. REV. 373, 379 (2004). 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 379–80. 
20. Id. at 380.  For instance, as your author is painfully aware, both Columbus, Ohio, and 
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governments may also charge fees or special assessments for specific 
benefits provided to individual constituents.21  For example, bus fare, 
dog licenses, and charges for water, sewer, and garbage disposal are all 
revenue generating activities that are not thought to be taxes but which 
are, nonetheless, an increasingly important component of local public 
finance.22 
Most scholars who study public finance at the local level credit a rise 
of fee usage by local governments to state restrictions on the local taxing 
power.23  Over the past three decades, state statutory and constitutional 
restrictions on local tax and spending decisions have become more 
commonplace and, interestingly, many such provisions found their 
genesis in the direct democratic process itself.24  California’s Proposition 
13 is a generally acknowledged progenitor of these measures,25 and in 
light of my recommendation that states permit local governments to use 
direct democracy in a proportional manner, a brief discussion of its 
passage and broader effect is warranted.  The subject has been 
extensively covered elsewhere, so this overview will not be 
comprehensive.26  Rather, it is intended to highlight one way in which 
direct democracy comes to the fore in tax and spending decisions: 
through the voter initiative process. 
Popularly hailed as the beginning of a nationwide property tax 
revolt, California’s Proposition 13 is one of the most discussed direct 
democratic tax decisions of the past century.27  As such, it is 
 
New York City, New York, have income taxes at the local level. 
21. Id. at 381. 
22. Id.  Prevented by voters from raising taxes, local governments have made increasing 
use of fees and assessments, which has given rise to criticism.  Professor Laurie Reynolds 
observes that local governments’ greater reliance on fees may “have a privatizing effect on 
government services.”  Id. at 380; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 1241, 1244 (2009) (noting that limiting the taxing power of home-rule cities forces 
them to rely on other instruments of funding, which “has a more subtle and potentially more 
notorious consequence of instantiating a particularly limited view of the proper role of 
cities”). 
23. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1253 (stating that studies claim tax caps shift local 
government toward greater use of fees); Reynolds, supra note 17, at 392–93 (noting local 
governments increasingly resort to fees because fees are not subject to tax caps).  
24. See Stark, supra note 9, at 192–93. 
25. See id. at 192; Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Difficulties in Achieving Coherent State and 
Local Fiscal Policy at the Intersection of Direct Democracy and Republicanism: The Property 
Tax as a Case in Point, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 511, 532 (2002). 
26. Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an enormous literature.”). 
27. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 14 (noting that popular referendum was a watershed 
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unquestionably relevant to the appropriate role of direct democratic 
processes in tax decision-making.  Rather than serve as a model for the 
process, I assert that Proposition 13 and its progeny created an 
imbalance between direct and representative democracy that may force 
local representatives to make suboptimal decisions, either underfunding 
necessary public goods, or seeking to supply these goods through 
accounting subterfuge.28  I further argue that correcting the balance of 
direct and representative democracy could prevent future constituent 
overreach through the direct democratic process.29  The question is 
particularly timely, with representative governments and constituents 
currently in tension with one another as both groups seek to recover 
from ongoing financial strain.30 
The state constitutional amendment approved by Proposition 13, 
which specifies that local property tax rates must “not exceed One 
percent (1%) of the full cash value of such property,” resulted from 
citizens’ dissatisfaction with modernization of California’s antiquated 
property tax regime.31  In the years immediately preceding Proposition 
13, California and other states began to eradicate a practice called 
fractional assessment.32  Although not explicitly permitted by law, local 
tax assessors were known to assess properties at a fraction of their true 
value.33  Because property taxes are the product of the local tax rate and 
property value, fractional assessment reduced the tax liability of those 
whose property was undervalued by an assessor.34  As one might 
imagine, this practice placed an undue amount of discretion in the hands 
 
moment in tax politics); Robinson, supra note 25, at 533 (“Proposition 13’s passage ignited a 
conflagration.”); Stark, supra note 9, at 192 n.7 (“Prop 13 has spawned an enormous 
literature.”). 
28. For instance, localities that are subject to capital spending restrictions may seek to 
provide public goods by leasing them rather than actually purchasing them, circumventing the 
capital spending restriction. 
29. Or, at the very least, it could stem constituent discontent arising from the inability to 
selectively locate, a la Tiebout, in a jurisdiction where the level of public goods matches 
constituents’ preferences.  For a brief discussion of Tiebout sorting, see infra Part V.D.   
30. See Michael Cooper, More Gloom Lies Ahead for Cities, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 27, 2011, at A10 (discussing that cities must cut spending as a result of lower property 
tax revenues and less aid from states). 
31. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA §§ 1–7; see also MARTIN, supra note 10, at 10–15. 
32. MARTIN, supra note 10, at 12; see also Robinson, supra note 25, at 523–25 (discussing 
how fairer assessment increased taxes which, in turn, increased taxpayer complaints). 
33. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 7. 
34. Id. at 6–15. 
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of assessors, who were generally elected officials.35  On the tax books, 
then, influential families and campaign contributors may have appeared 
to reside in a modest home, while those with less social or economic 
clout notionally lived large.36  According to at least one scholar, 
fractional assessment of property values was the single largest tax 
subsidy of the post-war era—ten times greater than the home mortgage 
interest deduction.37 
As a matter of equity, fractional assessment was a disaster, and the 
push for social justice in the 1960s eventually resulted in sweeping 
amendments to the system.38  California created a central administration 
with standardized assessment procedures, and as a consequence, the 
property values used to calculate local taxes rose precipitously.39  
Although standardization furthered fairness by equalizing the taxation 
of similarly situated property holders within a locality, it also shocked 
the citizenry, who responded in an unprecedented way.40  Studies have 
shown that Proposition 13 protestors came from all walks of life and 
from both sides of the political aisle.41  The Proposition 13 tax protest 
was different from conservative anti-tax movements today, mainly 
because it was a bipartisan uprising.42 
 
35. Id. at 7. 
36. Id. at 12–13. 
37. Id. at 9. 
38. Id. at 12. 
39. Id. at 12–13.  Prior to the amendment, most people paid tax on only a portion of the 
value of their property, which provided insulation for market shocks.  This was particularly 
important in California, where wartime and postwar construction sent property values 
skyward.  Id. 
40. See Robinson, supra note 25, at 530 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court 
“characterized Proposition 13 as . . . possibly ‘improvident’” (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 
U.S. 1, 17 (1992)); Stark, supra note 9, at 199 (explaining that Proposition 13 was “radical” in 
nature, and it is “not surprising that almost everyone writing about Proposition 13 has 
described it as a ‘revolt’”). 
41. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 3. 
42. See id.  Today’s movement is more one-sided.  See Brian Montopoli, Tea Party 
Supporters: Who They Are and What They Believe, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20002529-503544.html.  A New York Times and 
CBS news poll showed that among Tea Party supporters 54% considered themselves 
Republicans, but 66% stated that they always or usually voted Republican, while 73% of Tea 
Party backers consider their political philosophy to be somewhat or very conservative.  Id.; 
CNN Polling Ctr., Who Are the Tea Party Activists, CNN OPINION RES. CORP. (Feb. 17, 
2010), http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/02/17/rel4b.pdf (showing polling data 
explaining that more than three fourths of tea party activists consider themselves 
conservatives, and 87% would vote for Republican candidates in their own district if there 
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Scholars almost universally agree that Proposition 13 was the first 
domino to fall in citizens’ direct democratic bid to seize control of local 
finance.43  Immediately afterward, a wave of states voted on tax and 
spending limits in what commentators have termed “tax revolts.”44  As a 
result, a number of state constitutions now contain express limitations 
on the tax and spending powers of local governments.45  Professor Stark 
has noted that these restrictions tend to fall into two broad categories: 
(1) direct measures that limit the tax rate, tax base, or spending 
decisions, and (2) procedural measures such as those that require a 
popular vote or supermajority approval requirements for new taxes or 
increased rates.46 
Although the efficacy and advisability of direct democratic tax and 
spending restrictions necessarily vary on the basis of local government 
and constituent composition, the eventual scholarly consensus has been 
qualified disapproval.47  Rather than join those who approve or 
disapprove of the voter-imposed limitations, I instead suggest that 
guiding direct democratic tax decision-making is a better solution than 
either relying on it or undermining it.  This is because, with guidance, 
voter involvement can create a constructive environment that provides 
the representative government with information on voter preferences 
and fosters constituent cooperation in the provision of public goods.48 
B.  What Is Wrong with Direct Democratic Tax Restrictions? 
To best understand how to usefully employ direct democratic 
decision-making in the local tax arena, we must understand both the 
flaws that it seeks to correct and the structural limitations imposed by its 
 
were no Tea Party-endorsed candidate). 
43. For example, see Robinson, supra note 25, at 532 (“Proposition 13 set off a chain 
reaction.”). 
44. Stark, supra note 9, at 191–92 (noting that Colorado, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, 
and Washington all have voted in favor of constitutional amendments requiring local 
governments to seek approval through popular vote on new and increased taxes); see also 
Robinson, supra note 25, at 532–33. 
45. See Stark, supra note 9, at 191–92. 
46. Id. at 193. 
47. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252–53 (noting that while constraints on the 
taxing power can, in theory, be corrective, in reality they are “a rather blunt instrument that 
can have perverse effects”); Robinson, supra note 25, at 518 (arguing that “unmonitored 
ballot box fiscal activity has gone too far,” and that such restrictions have a “potentially 
crippling effect” on the ability of local government to organize its finances). 
48. See infra Part III. 
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current form.  One means of doing so is to look more closely at the 
narrative of Proposition 13 to the extent that it serves as a 
representative example.  It is clear that Proposition 13 was a direct voter 
response to bad decisions made by local governments.  Local 
governments made up of elected officials failed to effectively limit the 
discretion wielded by tax assessors, who were also elected officials.  This 
resulted not only in patronage but also in generally regressive effective 
rates of property taxation.49  Also, when this problem was corrected 
through state centralization, local governments made up of elected 
officials failed to adjust property tax rates downward in response to an 
increase in assessed property values.50 
Although the first of these mistakes was, perhaps, openly and 
notoriously a part of the representative democratic process, the second, 
which led to the tax revolt, was seemingly a malfunction of the same 
process.  In other words, elected officials’ sudden insistence on 
collecting the full rate of property tax on the full value of constituents’ 
homes and businesses was not anticipated by the constituents who voted 
for the decision-making representatives.51  Rather, it was outside the 
scope of predictable local government action.  Put otherwise, the actions 
of elected officials were not, speaking colloquially, representative of 
constituents’ preferences, nor were they the result of a deliberative 
debate that weighed constituents’ preferences in a politically created 
balance.  State intervention, then, contributed to a failure of the local 
representative process.  In a libertarian-leaning society, it is natural that 
constituents responded to tone-deaf representative governments by 
reiterating their preferences directly, outside of the representative 
process.52 
A lack of symmetry between constituents’ preferences and the actual 
outcomes produced by representative democracy is not necessarily 
 
49. See MARTIN, supra note 10, at 6–15. 
50. See id. at 12–14. 
51. See id. 
52. See Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 
434, 435–36 (1998) (noting that direct democracy causes citizens to believe that they have a 
voice in governance); Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: 
Procedures that Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 48 (1995) (arguing that ballot 
initiative provides a political outlet for citizens who are dissatisfied with their representative 
government); Ethan J. Leib, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 
903, 905 (2006) (stating that direct democracy persists because representative government is 
“often too remote from the people”). 
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troubling.  In fact, the same result is common at all levels of government 
in the United States.53  Furthermore, it is not troubling that 
representative governments produce unexpected outcomes under 
unexpected circumstances.  However, a radical deviation from the 
expected course of governance, such as California local governments’ 
failure to adjust tax rates in response to a drastic state-mandated 
widening of the tax base, may fall beyond the scope of actions and 
omissions implicitly approved by constituents.  It is possible to claim 
that Proposition 13 arose as a direct result of constituents’ perception 
that local governments were grabbing assets in a way that exceeded not 
the formal, but the implicit scope of representatives’ authority.  In 
response, voters made the scope of their implicit grant of authority 
explicit through the enactment of express limitations on the 
representative government. 
If we accept this version of events, it becomes clear that the balance 
of representative and direct democracy in tax decision-making should be 
delineated in terms of appropriate local government functions.  Assume 
for a moment a pure form of representative democracy where officials 
are elected by constituents to act on their behalf in local governance.  In 
this scenario, local government officials are agents of sorts.  They are 
empowered by constituents to make decisions on the constituents’ 
behalf on matters delegated to them.54  This delegation occurs not only 
 
53. Constituents commonly complain that government has failed to represent their 
interests.  See, e.g., Cathleen Decker, Unhappy but Not About to Change, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 
2010, at A33 (citing that approval rates for California state legislators were at 16%, and 22% 
for the governor); Steve Kraske et al., In Missouri and Kansas, Wrath Runs High, but Voters 
Are Likely to Be Few Tuesday, KAN. CITY STAR, Aug. 1, 2010, at A1 (citing nationwide high 
levels of discontent of Americans, as evidenced by only 21% approval of the job Congress is 
doing, and only 33% believing that America is headed in the right direction); Megan Thee-
Brenan & Marina Stefan, “The System Is Broken”: More from a Poll of Tea Party Backers, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at N14 (“They call themselves my representatives, but basically 
they don’t represent me.  They’re forever saying things like we need to reach across the aisle.  
Well, I don’t want you to reach across the aisle.  The other side wants to control my life, 
overtax me and spend in insane ways.” (quoting a truck driver)); Kate Zernike & Megan 
Thee-Brenan, Discontent’s Demography: Who Backs the Tea Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2010, at A1 (noting that activists argue that recent healthcare overhaul and government 
spending demonstrate that their opinions are not being represented in Washington). 
54. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“[A]ll power derives 
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create.”).  For 
examples of state constitutions granting local governments such power, see CAL. CONST. art. 
XI, §§ 3–4 (stating that counties or cities have the power to adopt their own charters 
providing for the type of local governing body and other elected officials); CAL. CONST. art. 
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through governing documents such as the state constitution, city charter, 
or state statutes, but also through the collective expectations of the 
electorate.55  In the following Parts, I will refer to this delegation of 
authority through constituents’ collective expectations as an implicit 
delegation. 
C.  Is Voter Control an Effective Political Check or a Power Grab? 
In states where direct democracy exists, implicit delegation of 
authority by constituents may serve as a very real limitation on the 
representative government.56  This is because actions of a representative 
democratic government that fall beyond the scope of constituents’ 
implicit delegation of authority may increase the risk of constituent 
revolt.  It is reasonable to surmise that constituents perceive voting as a 
means of making their voices heard on the range of local governance 
issues.  However, this is rarely the case, since constituents’ votes for 
candidates do little to reveal their preferences on individual matters.57  
As a result, actions of the representative government may have little to 
do with constituent preferences.  If the local government action or 
 
XI, § 7 (stating that a county or city can enforce “all local, police, sanitary, and other 
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with [state] general laws”); N.Y. CONST. art. IX, 
§§ 1–2 (stating that local governments are empowered to elect representatives who in turn 
can adopt local laws as long as they are not in conflict with state general or special laws); 
OHIO CONST. art. X, §§ 2–3 (stating that counties and townships have township trustees 
which are permitted to collect local taxes and have charters which designate the form of 
government and determine in what areas counties may have exclusive authority as long as 
that power is permitted under the Constitution and laws of the state); and OHIO CONST. art. 
XVIII, §§ 3, 7 (explaining that municipalities have similar powers to counties and townships 
in that they have the authority to adopt their own charters and adopt local laws as long as not 
in conflict with state general laws). 
55. See supra text accompanying notes 52, 54.  For additional examples of explicit 
statutory delegations of power, see 53 PA. CONS. STAT. (West 2009).  This title grants a wide 
variety of powers to municipalities, including, among other things, the power to undertake 
school district projects, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5606, acquire land and water rights, id. § 5615, 
and provide administrative services to business improvement districts, id. § 5404. 
56. For a disturbing example, consider California’s Proposition 8.  This controversial 
ballot proposition amended the California Constitution to ban gay marriage, which was 
formerly available in some California cities, most notably San Francisco.  See CALIFORNIA 
ATT’Y GEN., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 128 (2008), available at 
http://www.voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws 
.pdf#prop8 (containing Proposition 8’s official language). 
57. See Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1514 
(1990) (arguing that voters’ choice of candidates does not reveal their preferences on 
individual issues). 
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inaction surpasses that which could have been anticipated by 
constituents, the government acts without implicit authorization of its 
constituents, even if it acts with explicit statutory or constitutional 
authorization.  Constituents may believe that representatives are either 
unable to perceive their implicit delegation of authority,58 or that 
representatives are simply ignoring the limits of that delegation.59  As a 
consequence, where the cost of an implicitly unauthorized action is high, 
constituents may resort to means other than the representative 
democratic process, such as complaint, protest, or, more forcefully, a 
ballot initiative formally limiting the scope of local government.60  In this 
 
58. See Tracy M. Gordon, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Ballot Box: Causes and 
Consequences of Local Voter Initiatives, 141 PUB. CHOICE 31, 33 (2009) (noting that empirical 
evidence demonstrates initiatives are employed more frequently in larger, more diverse 
jurisdictions, a finding consistent with explanations of direct democracy arising from 
“legislative uncertainty about voter preferences”); Eule, supra note 57, at 1504, 1521 (stating 
notion that “legislative enactments represent majority will” is a “fiction” and, later, stating 
that it is “fanciful” to equate preferences of representatives with preferences of their 
constituents). 
59. There are a number of explanations for why representatives may not act in 
accordance with constituents’ wishes.  Because representatives face only binary elections, a 
constituent’s vote for a representative is not a guarantee that the representative will act in 
accordance with that particular constituent’s desire on a given issue.  See Gillette, supra note 
22, at 1252.  Voters may retain representatives that have done a good job in some things but 
not in others, so long as government runs smoothly.  Id.  Furthermore, local elections may be 
less competitive, so the electoral check may be less effective at this level.  Id.  As a result, 
electoral politics do not ensure a truly representative government.  Worse yet, dominant 
interest groups may possess sufficient power to set the legislative and political agendas so that 
voters have only a limited set of choices, few or none of which reflect their preferences.  See 
Arthur Denzau et al., Spending Limitations, Agenda Control and Voters’ Expectations, 32 
NAT’L TAX J. 189, 189 (Supp. 1979).  Finally, and more cynically, representatives may 
respond to perverse incentives, such as the contrary interests of wealthy campaign donors.  
Leib, supra note 52, at 905.   
60. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 48 (arguing that direct democracy provides 
political outlet for citizens who are dissatisfied with representative government); Elizabeth 
Garrett, Democracy in the Wake of the California Recall, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 239, 278 (2004) 
(noting that some view initiatives and referenda as causes of poor representative government 
but that this view fails to recognize that the resurgence of direct democracy was a direct result 
of public distrust and disgust of representative government); Gordon, supra note 58, at 33 
(stating that initiatives are employed more frequently in jurisdictions where diversity of 
political attributes and lack of stability in population make it difficult for representative 
government to discern wishes of the median voter); John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy 
Works, 19 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 185, 192 (2005) (explaining that direct democracy affects 
policy by allowing public to “override decisions of unfaithful elected officials”); John G. 
Matsusaka, The Eclipse of Legislatures: Direct Democracy in the 21st Century, 124 PUB. 
CHOICE 157, 162 (2005) (arguing that legislatures are being replaced by the public in making 
laws on important social issues in part because of a decline in confidence of legislatures). 
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scenario, we might characterize the resulting ballot initiative as a direct 
democratic check on representative democracy.61  Less charitably, we 
could characterize it as a collective power grab by constituents in the 
political majority to prevent redistribution of assets through the 
provision of public goods or direct grants to those in the political 
minority.62 
Direct democracy that functions as a power grab rather than a check 
is particularly troubling from a normative standpoint.  Just as 
representative democratic local governments can overstep their 
boundaries by seizing private interests, direct democracy may allow 
private citizens to overstep their boundaries by seizing public interests.63  
This happens, at the very least, when direct-democratically enacted tax 
 
61. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (noting that electoral politics alone may be 
insufficient to prevent representative government from acting in contravention to constituent 
wishes); Leib, supra note 52, at 905 (arguing that direct democracy allows citizens to correct 
for legislators’ response to perverse incentives such as the need to amass campaign 
contributions). 
62. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 
294 (2007) (stating that direct democracy is “used to disadvantage minorities”); Clark, supra 
note 52, at 434 (explaining that due to uneven voter turnout and influence of special interests, 
direct democracy does not necessarily produce a result preferred by constituents); see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 288 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898) (“If a majority 
be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”); Gillette, supra 
note 22, at 1245 (stating that “disparate treatment of taxes and fees implies a distrustful view 
of redistribut[ion]” at the local level); Gordon, supra note 58, at 32 (noting that empirical data 
demonstrates “that states where the initiative is available have spent less and relied less on 
taxes”); Richard Hasen, Assessing California’s Hybrid Democracy, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1501, 
1502–03 (2009) (book review) (stating that direct democracy is “too blunt”). 
63. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 3 (discussing a failed property tax levy that resulted in 
police and fire department cuts of more than $5.5 million, and how the city turned off street 
lights in an effort to reduce its electric bill, and remove trash cans from city parks in a further 
effort to conserve limited funds); Krugman, supra note 3 (“Colorado Springs has made 
headlines with its desperate attempt to save money by turning off a third of its streetlights, 
but similar things are either happening or being contemplated across the nation, from 
Philadelphia to Fresno.”); Karen Kucher et al., Brownout May Have Had Role in Tot’s Death, 
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 21, 2010, http://www.utsandiego.com/n ews/2010/jul/21/fire-
dept-blames-browouts-toddlere-death/ (discussing how funding cuts to fire department 
contributed to death of boy and failure to meet national emergency response time standards).  
But see David N. Figlio & Arthur O’Sullivan, The Local Response to Tax Limitation 
Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?, 44 J.L. & ECON. 
233, 233 (2001) (stating that cities subject to statewide tax limitations may manipulate 
spending to encourage positive tax voting by making visible cuts to services while preserving 
spending at the administrative level); Gillette, supra note 22, at 1253 (stating that broad 
restrictions on cities’ fiscal authority can have perverse effects on spending, including visible 
service cuts intended to induce favorable tax voting). 
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restrictions impinge on the representative government’s provision of 
essential public goods agreed upon through deliberation and debate.64 
Additional arguments against the use of direct democracy in tax 
decisions and other areas of governance are numerous.  For instance, 
Professor Robinson has asserted that, “[b]y its very nature, ballot box 
revenue-collection and budgeting cannot be informed by coherent tax or 
fiscal policy.”65  This is mainly a result of procedural defects in the direct 
democratic process.66  Critics of direct democracy argue that initiatives 
are often poorly drafted67 and are seldom understood by constituents.68 
In addition, the process is subject to capture by well-funded interest 
groups even when their objectives deviate from those of the median 
voter.69  Furthermore, because voter participation may be quite low, 
 
64. See Clark, supra note 52, at 463 (noting that representative government requires 
“balancing, blending, and reconciling the sometimes conflicting desires” of various 
constituents into a coherent plan of governance). 
65. Robinson, supra note 25, at 518.  This is because the direct democratic process makes 
it nearly impossible for voters to “consider and accommodate competing principles in the 
fiscal lawmaking process.”  Id. at 543.  Furthermore, the initiative process is less deliberative 
than the usual means through which a statute or regulation is created and enforced.  See id. at 
546–47; see also Leo P. Martinez, Tax Policy, Rational Actors, and Other Myths, 40 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 297, 312 (2009) (“[T]he public seems largely ignorant of how taxes work.”).  
66. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, passim.  
67. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 297–98 (stating initiatives are poorly drafted 
because the usual checks on legislative drafting, such as committee participation and review, 
are absent); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 77 (discussing that initiatives can be poorly 
drafted because they are created by partisans, sometimes in secret); Leib, supra note 52, at 
908 (stating poor drafting may be deliberate in an effort to mislead voters). 
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 299–300 (arguing as a result of voters’ lack of 
information on the purpose and function of local initiatives, the process lacks the element of 
deliberative debate needed for informed decision-making); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, 
at 76 (drafting may be intentionally complex to confuse voters); Eule, supra note 57, at 1516 
(“Considering the complexity and obtuseness of some measures, it’s a wonder anyone knows 
what he or she is voting on.”); Shawn P. Flaherty, “Dollars, CPI, and Voter Empowerment”: 
Public Act 94-976 and Its Impact on Local Government Tax Referenda, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
377, 387 (2007) (showing surveys of voter comfort with initiatives and referenda reveal that 
many voters either needed more information or had difficulty reading and comprehending 
the ballot); Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How 
Direct Democracy Is Shaping American Cities, PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y, July 2008, at 
39, 47 (2008) (discussing exit poll of voters in San Diego revealing that a majority were unsure 
of contents of ballot propositions and approximately half who answered factual questions 
about the propositions gave incorrect responses); Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct 
Democracy: Restoring Voter Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1145–46 (2003) (noting that surveys of voters demonstrate that many do 
not understand the nature of the ballot measures on which they are voting). 
69. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 298 (noting that anyone with sufficient funding 
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particularly in local elections, a very small number of voters may drive 
the decision-making process.70  Alternatively, a majority of voters may 
use the process to push through a political position targeted at a then-
disfavored group such as sexual, religious, or racial minorities.71  Finally, 
because voters have used the direct democratic process to limit local 
governments’ ability to raise revenue, and because the amount of 
services provided by local governments is directly tied to the amount of 
revenue they can generate, direct democratic tax decision-making also 
has the power to impinge on the essential functions of local 
government.72 
Despite these difficulties, very few commentators have called for the 
 
can avoid checks inherent in the legislative process by simply placing an issue on the ballot); 
Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 92 (noting that the common criticism of direct 
democracy is “that money unduly corrupts the initiative process”); Denzau et al., supra note 
59, at 189 (arguing that powerful interest groups may capture the political agenda so as to 
present voters with only limited choices, few or none of which reflect median voters’ 
preferences); Hasen, supra note 62, at 1511 (discussing polling data from California indicating 
that voters “are concerned about the role of money” in the initiative process); Kang, supra 
note 68, at 1147 (stating excessive campaign spending can influence the election result); Leib, 
supra note 52, at 906–07 (arguing individuals or groups with more funding are able to control 
the debate). 
70. See Clark, supra note 52, at 434 (stating that uneven voter turn-out may engender 
results that obscure the popular will); Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 68, at 42 (voter 
turnout can be extremely low in local elections); Leib, supra note 52, at 909–10 (explaining 
that “empirical evidence also reveals that those who vote in ballot-measures elections are 
older, more educated, richer, and more ideological than the general population,” and thus are 
not representative); see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 391–92 (noting that low voter turn-
out for conventional voting may be a reason to favor proportional-tax voting). 
71. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (finding unconstitutional direct 
democratic amendment of the Colorado Constitution forbidding government from extending 
legal protection to gay persons); Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294–97 (arguing because 
direct democracy lacks the checks and balances present in representative government, ballot 
initiatives such as the recent Michigan civil rights initiative, may be used to disadvantage 
minorities); Oesterle, supra note 7 (showing that in 2004 eleven states approved measures 
blocking same sex marriage).  For an unfortunate example of this phenomenon in reverse, see 
Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 19 
(1997) (noting that unlike western states, southern states avoided the use of direct democracy 
when adopting their post-Civil War constitutions in an effort to disenfranchise recently freed 
African Americans).  For an international example of direct democracy employed in a 
discriminatory fashion, see Nick Cumming-Bruce, Swiss Ban on Minaret Building Meets 
Widespread Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, at A15 (discussing popular Swiss referendum 
banning construction of minarets characterized as Islamophobic). 
72. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
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abolition of direct democracy in tax decision-making.73  This is because it 
provides a necessary and useful check on representative democracy.74  
What is needed, then, is a means of usefully channeling, rather than 
eliminating, direct democracy.  In other words, the ability of a political 
majority to seize power from the representatives—who are supposed to 
protect the interests of the political minority—necessitates creation of a 
check on the direct democratic check. 
Commentators have called for a number of restraints on the use of 
direct democracy in tax decision-making, the bulk of which are beyond 
the scope of this Article.  Suggestions include, among others, amending 
state constitutions to limit the use of direct democracy in tax and 
spending decisions, limiting voter input on those decisions to referenda 
originating with the legislature, offering multiple combinations of tax 
and spending choices on ballots to allow for more deliberative decisions, 
and changing the final product of the initiative process into instructions 
to the legislature rather than a constitutional amendment.75  Although 
each of these proposals could certainly have the effect of preventing 
direct democratic incursion on essential governmental functions, all but 
one of them—offering multiple funding levels on ballots—would create 
inorganic strictures on direct democracy’s ability to function as a check 
on representative democracy.76  Naturally, any rigid measure designed to 
 
73. Robinson, supra note 25, at 559 (noting that “[r]epeal would be, at a minimum, 
politically unpopular”). 
74. Id. (arguing that properly structured initiatives “could serve as an important safety 
valve and could be a very useful conduit for public opinion”). 
75. Id. at 562–65. 
76. In addition, there are a multitude of non-tax specific proposals for improvement of 
the direct democratic process, some of which I will draw upon in later parts of the Article.  
For examples, see Clark, supra note 52, at 471 (noting a recommendation to account for voter 
prioritization of ballot issues through (a) “cumulative plebiscitary voting” where “each voter 
would be allotted a number of votes equal to the number of initiatives,” which the voter may 
distribute among the initiatives according to both priority and preference, and (b) multi-issue 
ballot usage where voters may choose between various plausible combinations of government 
action); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 52, at 107–13 (recommending addressing procedural 
flaws by requiring use of indirect initiative where citizens first approach the legislature, 
instituting word limits and a single-subject rule, requiring a longer qualifying period, and 
treating laws resulting from initiatives the same as statutes passed by the legislature); Kang, 
supra note 68, at 1143 (discussing a recommendation to address lack of citizen understanding 
and competence by providing ready access to “heuristic cues,” such as public endorsement by 
prominent figures); Leib, supra note 52, at 915–16 (discussing recommendation to introduce 
an element of deliberative debate to direct democracy through creation of a new “popular 
branch” of government comprised of citizens who are required to serve for a limited time 
similar to jurors and who debate and produce recommendations on issues); Glen Staszewski, 
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protect the tax and spending process from popular intrusion will shift 
power from constituents to elected representatives, giving 
representatives more latitude to act beyond the scope of the authority 
implicitly delegated to them.  In other words, the two decision-making 
processes exist in balance with one another.  Unless placed in a 
collaborative relationship, one will always lose power when the other 
one gains.  Our goal, then, should not be a one-size-fits-all solution, but 
rather a means of creating the appropriate equilibrium within individual 
localities. 
Short of an omnipotent oracle to pronounce when direct democracy 
is and is not appropriate, we cannot create a locality-specific equilibrium 
through rules-based restrictions on direct democracy.  For this reason, I 
do not suggest any additional inorganic limitation of representative or 
direct democratic processes in public finance.  Rather, as described 
more fully below, I propose retention of the existing direct democratic 
and representative processes and the addition of one new piece: creation 
of specific opportunities for the exercise of direct democracy in local 
government spending decisions.  Stated more precisely, citizens should 
be permitted to opt out of paying for certain narrowly defined, non-
essential expenditures such as local fireworks or movies in the park.  Of 
course, these opportunities to voice an opinion on spending cannot fully 
alleviate the threat of direct democratic usurpation of local 
governments’ power to provide the essential goods and services.  In fact, 
they may seem unimportant at first blush.  But giving voters a greater 
decision-making role in non-essential spending has the potential to 
increase civic participation and buy-in while decreasing the likelihood 
that constituents will seek blunderbuss all-or-nothing solutions to local 
tax and spending concerns. 
D.  Why Might Constituent–Government Collaboration Be Beneficial? 
Ample evidence supports the assertion that localities may benefit by 
allowing constituents to take a role in decision-making on tax and 
spending issues.  Although the traditional model of collective action 
supposes self-interested individuals who will not contribute to the 
 
The Bait-and-Switch in Direct Democracy, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 17, 56 (stating recommendation 
to apply structural safeguards applicable to federal agency actions, such as notice and 
comment hearings and court review using the arbitrary and capricious standard, to direct 
democratic actions). 
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collective good if they can instead free-ride,77 behavioral science has 
proven otherwise.78  It is now generally accepted that when asked to 
contribute to public goods, people will behave cooperatively if they 
believe that others are doing the same.79  Likewise, if people believe that 
others are shirking, they will retaliate in kind.80  In fact, researchers have 
posited that this response to others’ level of cooperation is stronger than 
an individual’s motivation to maximize wealth.81  As Professor Kahan 
has noted, “In sum, individuals behave like the amoral calculators 
posited by the conventional theory only when they believe that others 
are cheaters; if they believe that others are morally motivated to 
comply, they reciprocate by complying in turn, whether or not they 
believe they could profitably evade.”82 
So effectual is the influence of observed cooperation that “collective 
behavior is susceptible to multiple, self-sustaining equilibria depending 
on the beliefs individuals form about the likely behavior of others.”83  In 
other words, when one person cooperates in response to another, her 
action may foster the cooperation of a third person, and so on.  This may 
have an observable effect of social influence,84 which may affect political 
decision-making.85  For instance, a bandwagon effect may influence a 
constituent to back a winning candidate or cause, or aversion to acting 
against popular opinion could prevent a constituent from choosing an 
unpopular candidate or cause.86  Studies of why people obey the law 
 
77. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1–2 (1965). 
78. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333 
(2001) [hereinafter Kahan, Trust] (“[A]s a wealth of empirical social science evidence now 
makes clear, Olson’s Logic is false.”). 
79. Id. at 334. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 335. 
82. Id. at 341–42. 
83. Id. at 339. 
84. See Kahan, Gentle Nudges, supra note 6, at 615–16 (“When an individual perceives 
that a relatively large group of like-situated people are engaging in a certain form of behavior, 
she is more likely to engage in the that behavior, too; this increases the size of the group, 
inducing even more individuals [to join the group] . . . .”).  “Social influence” can be defined 
as the tendency of individuals to conform their conduct to the conduct of others.  Dan Kahan, 
Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1997) [hereinafter 
Kahan, Social Influence].   
85. Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 84, at 353. 
86. Id. 
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have produced similar results.87  As noted by Professor Lederman, 
survey data consistently show that people who report compliance with 
tax laws believe that other taxpayers are also in compliance, while those 
who report non-compliance believe that other taxpayers also cheat.88  
This effect may be the strongest when social influence arises through an 
individual’s observation of reference groups, which are groups of people 
with whom the individual identifies or with whom she aspires to be 
identified.89  Research has shown that not only are people likely to adopt 
the norms of their reference groups,90 but “they support or oppose 
particular regulations as a way to express solidarity with their groups.”91  
In fact, this can happen even if an individual has no more information 
about a particular group than the results of a simple opinion poll.92 
The research described above, if generalizable, suggests that 
allowing constituents to take a role in decision-making and allowing 
them to access aggregate information about others’ decisions could 
create a more cooperative local environment as well as imbue certain 
spending decisions with more legitimacy.93  Indeed, research on criminal 
punishment has demonstrated that by relaxing its monopoly in favor of 
community involvement, the government can achieve greater legitimacy 
 
87. See id. at 354. 
88. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1469 (2003). 
89. See Richard G. Hall et al., The Effect of Reference Groups, Opinion Polls, and 
Attitude Polarization on Attitude Formation and Change, 7 POL. PSYCHOL. 309, 310 (1986).  
“Reference group” can be described as a group to which an individual relates and compares 
himself.  Id. 
90. Id. at 319. 
91. Kenworthey Bilz & Janice Nadler, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 50 THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 101, 122 (Daniel M. Bartels et al. eds., 
2009). 
92. Hall et al., supra note 89, at 320. 
93. See Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1059, 1106–
10 (arguing that because the acts of one’s own group members can imbue state actions with 
legitimacy, community involvement in governance can foster a perception of legitimacy); 
Kahan, Social Influence, supra note 84, at 352–53 (stating that individuals are more likely to 
cooperate when they believe that others are cooperating); see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 
406 (noting that moving away from mandatory tax toward voluntary contribution may 
develop constituents’ commitment to a cause); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and 
Influence to Narrow the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 525 (2009) (suggesting that 
federal pro-tax messages could be made more salient by allowing taxpayers to earmark a 
portion of taxes for public goods that they support). 
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of action in the eyes of constituents.94  The same should be true of local 
government’s monopoly over tax and spending decisions.  Facilitating 
constituent choice in areas of non-essential spending should increase 
constituent satisfaction with the results of such spending.  Furthermore, 
overall constituent support for non-essential spending should foster 
cooperation on the part of individual constituents, thereby increasing 
civic buy-in.  In the alternative, if the bulk of constituents are 
unsupportive of non-essential spending, the representative government 
will be unable to engage in some portion of it.  In either case, the chance 
of tax revolt is lessened. 
III.  PROPOSAL FOR OPT-OUT FINANCING OF NON-ESSENTIAL 
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
In the second part of this Article, I have suggested that the current 
balance of representative and direct democracy in local tax and 
spending decisions is suboptimal, primarily because direct democracy 
may over-correct for the excesses of representative democracy and 
because current forms of direct democracy operate on an all-or-nothing 
basis.  Over-correction may be a result of constituents’ views that, 
although representative local governments have acted within the letter 
of the law, their actions have fallen beyond the boundaries of 
constituents’ implicit delegation of authority to representatives.95  
Because tax law does not abide by the rules of physics, constituent 
reactions to perceived excesses are neither equal nor opposite.  Instead, 
they have historically resulted in explicit delineations of the 
representative government’s authority that may regain the excess and 
then some.96  As such, direct democratic limitations and subsequent 
 
94. See Bilz, supra note 93, at 1110.  
95. See discussion supra Part II. 
96. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA–D (requiring that all taxes, including special and 
general, no matter who they are imposed on, must be approved by voters prior to taking 
effect); COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(4)(a) (new amendment mandating that there must be voter 
approval for “any new tax, tax rate increase . . . or a tax policy change directly causing a net 
tax revenue”); MICH. CONST. art. IX, §§ 25, 31 (limiting local property taxes and prohibiting 
local government from imposing any new tax or increasing the rate of any existing tax without 
approval from a majority of voters in that locality); MO. CONST. art. X, § 22 (requiring voter 
approval for any increased or new local taxes); see also Bert Waisanen, State Tax and 
Expenditure Limits—2008, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/default .aspx?tabid=12633 (last visited Jan. 23, 2012) (noting that voters 
in Colorado approved suspending the restrictive limits of the amendment for five years by 
allowing the state to retain all revenues, and citing a Washington state initiative requiring 
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voter refusal to approve tax levies have the potential to impede local 
governments’ ability to carry out essential functions.97 
Despite these perceived flaws, I do not propose that states place 
additional restrictions on the direct democratic process.  In my view, the 
threat of direct democracy serves as an important check on local 
representative governments.  Rather, I suggest that local governments 
create additional, targeted direct democratic processes that allow 
constituents to express preferences about some non-essential 
governmental spending as described below.98 
Specifically, I propose that local representative governments identify 
specific items of non-essential spending within the constraints set forth 
below and separate them from the remainder of the budget.  
Constituents would be permitted to opt out of paying for identified 
expenses.  By opting out or continuing to pay, constituents could 
individually voice and register preferences about the acceptable 
delegation of discretionary spending power to the local government.  An 
opt-out is preferable to an opt-in, I argue, because constituents who 
cannot be bothered to opt out generally will not have strong preferences 
about the expenses up for debate.  These constituents’ lack of strong 
preferences justifies a presumption in favor of the representative 
government.  I further propose basing the mechanism for this process on 
an existing opt-out system of public finance.  In the paragraphs that 
follow, I will describe a German tax system that could serve as a model 
for proportionate direct democratic decision-making through an opt-out 
process, describe important ways in which my proposed model differs 
from the existing German tax, set forth perceived benefits of the model, 
and address potential criticisms. 
A.  The German Church Tax as a Form of Local Tax 
Germany, as strange as it may seem, allows some religious 
 
voter approval if state revenue measures result in expenditure above the statutorily provided 
expenditure limit). 
97. See supra text accompanying note 64. 
98. As described in detail below, I view non-essential governmental spending as 
spending that is not mandated by state or federal statute, that does not relate to a good or 
service that is provided primarily by the local government, and that may fall beyond the 
aggregate implicit expectations of constituents about the scope of representative government 
given the circumstances in which the spending decision was made.  See infra Part III.C. 
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congregations to tax their congregants.99  A vestige of the Middle Ages, 
this system is nominally religious in nature but shares many attributes 
with local taxation in the United States.100  As a result, it makes an 
intriguing model for innovative public finance.101  Members of religious 
congregations are automatically enrolled in the congregation’s taxing 
jurisdiction, and taxes chosen by the congregation may be enforced by 
the state at the congregation’s request.102  In many cases, congregations 
have chosen an income tax that is collected through state wage 
withholding and then remitted back to the taxing organization.103  
Congregations often use the collected funds to provide goods and 
services to the general public, regardless of religious affiliation.104  These 
services, which are equally available to members and non-members in 
most cases, include kindergartens, recreation centers, schools, nursing 
homes, and hospitals, among other things.105 
 
99. See WEIMARER REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137, [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] 
[CONSTITUTION] art. 140 (Ger.); GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND art. 137, 140 [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.). 
100. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 635–37. 
101. See id. at 636–37. 
102. See, e.g., Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes Berlin [KiStG] [Berlin Church Tax 
Act], Apr. 2, 2009, GVBL. Berlin at 23, § 3(1); Kirchensteuergesetz des Bundeslandes 
Sachsen [SächsKiStG] [Saxony Church Tax Act], Mar. 14, 2002, SächsGVBL. at 82, last 
amended by Gesetz, Apr. 3, 2009, SächsGVBL. at 153, § 4(1); Kirchensteurgesetz des 
Bundeslandes Bayern [Bay KirStG] [Church Tax Act of the Federal State of Bavaria], Dec. 
22, 2008, Bay. GVBL. at 973, § 4. 
103. See KiStG, supra note 102, § 1(2) (stating that administration of the tax is the 
obligation of the tax-entitled religious community unless otherwise provided by law). 
Enforcement of the taxes under the statute will be self-administered by the tax-entitled 
religious community, according to the Verwaltungs-Vollstreckungsgesetz [VwVG] 
[Administration and Enforcement Act], Apr. 27, 1953, BGBI. I at 157, last amended by 
Gesetz, July 29, 2009, BGBI. I at 2258; see also Bay KirStG, supra note 102, § 17(1) (stating 
that levies must be administered by the religious organization, which may request the State 
Ministry of Finance to assume the collection function); Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in 
Germany, in STATE AND CHURCH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 57, 69 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 
1996) [hereinafter Robbers, State and Church]. 
104. See Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 63 (noting churches provide 
charitable works, the absence of which would vitiate the constitution’s guarantee of a social 
state); see also Christina Sticht, The Role of the Churches in Germany, GOETHE-INST. (May 
2004), http://www.goethe.de/ges/phi/dos/rkd/en2012816.htm. 
105. Gerhard Robbers, Minority Churches in Germany, in EUROPEAN CONSORTIUM 
FOR CHURCH–STATE RESEARCH, THE LEGAL STATUS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE 
COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 153, 163 (1993) [hereinafter Robbers, Minority 
Churches]; Jens Petersen, The Church Tax in Germany: A Short Information, 
http://www.steuer-forum-kirche.de/church-tax.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
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Strikingly, the tax which helps to pay for these items is completely 
avoidable if one is willing to disavow religious affiliation or to switch to 
a congregation that does not levy the tax.106  This is easily accomplished 
by filing simple paperwork.107  Given the relative ease of the opt-out 
process, one might expect relatively few people to remain enrolled in 
the tax, particularly since only 22% of Germans are religiously active.108  
But the participation rate is surprisingly high.109  Nearly two-thirds of all 
German citizens are official members of tax-levying congregations.110  
Given the secular nature of German society, one plausible explanation 
for the high retention rate is public willingness to support local provision 
of public goods by religious organizations also functioning as secular 
quasi-governmental institutions.111 
Although categorizing a religious organization as quasi-
governmental would be blasphemous in the United States, Germany’s 
constitution, which provides that there shall be no state church, requires 
German states to grant “public law corporation” status to any 
requesting religious organization if it meets certain legal requirements.112  
In addition to the power to levy a tax, status as a public law corporation 
confers a number of other important rights upon religious organizations, 
including the right to employ clergy and other administrators as civil 
servants in the military, hospitals, universities, and other public 
 
106. For instance, see SächsKiStG, supra note 102, § 2 (defining church tax obligors as 
all natural persons who are members of the taxing church), and § 3 (stating that to withdraw 
from church membership, taxpayers must follow either the individual procedure of the taxing 
church or file an official affidavit with a local government office). 
107. Id. 
108. See Sticht, supra note 104. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 626. 
112. The organization’s composition and number of members ensure permanency.  See 
WEIMARAR REICHSVERFASSUNG art. 137; GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK 
DEUTSCHLAND art. 140 [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.).  In 
addition, a religious organization must show that it is not hostile to the constitutional order or 
to fundamental rights.  See Der Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas in Deutschland e. 
V., vertreten durch das Präsidium, 2 BvR 1500 (1997); see also Germany: International 
Religious Freedom Report 2008, U.S. STATE DEP’T (2008), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/71382.htm; Thilo Marauhn, Status, Rights, and 
Obligations of Religious Communities in a Human Rights Context: A European Perspective, 34 
ISR. L. REV. 600, 631–32 (2000).  This rule is intended to safeguard the limited government–
religious corporation partnership envisioned by the constitution.  Marauhn, supra, at 631–32. 
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facilities.113  In addition, religious organizations that qualify as public law 
corporations are exempt from bankruptcy laws, the corporate income 
tax, gift tax, and inheritance taxes.114  Representatives of religious 
organizations with public law corporation status also have the right to 
participate on public boards, such as the supervisory boards of public 
and private broadcasting stations, as well as boards that review films and 
literature for public suitability.115  Religious organizations may also draft 
ordinances applicable to their members.116  These internal legal systems, 
“which operate in parallel to the public laws,” can be striking in their 
complexity, and decisions rendered within them fall outside of the 
jurisdiction of Germany’s public courts.117  Taken as a whole, these rights 
suggest that religious organizations qualifying as public law corporations 
should be viewed as quasi-governmental in nature, often functioning in 
a manner similar to local government agencies here at home.118 
Like local governments, public law corporations have the power to 
tax their constituents.119  Congregations most often choose income as 
their tax base.  In all of the German states, the tax is levied at a uniform 
rate—8% or 9% of the church member’s federal income tax liability—
and usually collected by the state through wage withholding and then 
returned to the churches.120  This results in an effective rate of roughly 
 
113. See Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 159. 
114. See Körperschaftsteuergesetz [KStG] [Corporate Tax Act], Aug. 31, 1976, RGBL. I, 
repromulgated Oct. 15, 2002 BGBL. I at 4144, last amended by Gesetz, Apr. 8, 2010 BGBL. I 
at 386, § 5(1)(9); Erbschaftssteuer-und Schenkungsteuergesetz [ErbStG] [German 
Inheritance Tax Code] § 13(1)(16); Abgabenordnung [AO] [Inheritance and Gift Tax Act], 
Apr. 17, 1974, repromulgated Feb. 27, 2007 BGBL. I at 378, last amended by Gesetz, Dec. 22, 
2009 BGBL. I at 3950, § 13(1)(6); Abgabenordnung [AO], Mar. 16, 1976, repromulgated Oct. 
1, 2002 BGBL. I at 3866, §§ 51–68 (describing some of the qualifications that organizations 
must meet to obtain exempt status).  
115. Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 169. 
116. See Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 64. 
117. Id. 
118. Interestingly, state-sponsored churches and churches as local governments persisted 
in the original thirteen states far past the date of our nationhood.  See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent 
and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU 
L. REV. 1385, 1457–58 (2004).  In fact, religious establishment persisted in Massachusetts until 
1833.  Id. 
119. See GRUNDGESETZ FUR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND art. 140 
[GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], Aug. 11, 1919 (Ger.). 
120. This rate is determined by a conference of the taxing organizations.  SächsKiStG, 
supra note 102, § 10(2).  If the organizations cannot agree to a rate, the state finance 
administration must determine a rate.  Id.; Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 69.  
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3% to 4% of the member’s income.121  Like state and local taxes in the 
United States, German church taxes are deductible against income for 
purposes of calculating the federal income tax.122 
When viewed in this light, the resemblance between religious 
organizations that qualify as public law corporations and local 
governments is striking.  In addition to possessing many quasi-
governmental rights, public law corporations use a significant portion of 
the money raised through church taxes and governmental grants to fund 
schools, hospitals, recreational centers, and other social services.123  In 
other words, public law corporations share not only in the rights of local 
governments, but also in their duties.  It is this similarity that is most 
relevant to my proposal.  Germany has, in essence, created local tax and 
spending jurisdictions that depend not solely on geography, but also on 
the affiliation preferences of constituents.  Participation in these 
sectarian local jurisdictions is voluntary, and although the jurisdictions 
provide more public than private goods, they remain funded and 
viable.124  If we believe claims that Germans are more sectarian than 
secular as a group, the continued payment of church taxes by so many of 
them is a truly interesting phenomenon and indicates that despite the 
perceived threat of free-riders, an opt-out system of financing public 
goods is possible.125  Finally, it is worth noting that failure of an opt-out 
system to raise revenue is not a failure of the system.  Even if the 
 
Furthermore, the tax may be enforced by the state.  See KiStG, supra note 102, § 1(2) (noting 
that administration of the tax is the obligation of the tax-entitled religious community); 
KiStG, supra, § 11 (noting that enforcement of the taxes under the statute will be self-
administered by the tax-entitled religious community according to the Administration and 
Enforcement Statute of April 27, 1953); SächsKiStG, supra note 102, §§ 9–10.  The state 
retains an administrative fee of 4% to 5% of the amount collected.  See Robbers, Minority 
Churches, supra note 105, at 164.  
121. If one assumes an individual income tax rate of approximately 40% and a church 
tax rate of 8%, the effective rate is approximately 3.2% of income.  For an excellent 
discussion of the German income tax, see Walter Schwidetzky & Rolf Eicke, Income Taxation 
in the United States and Germany: The Rugged Individualist Meets the Social Activist, 27 J. 
TAX’N INV. 3 (2011). 
122. See Einkommensteuergesetz [EStG] Oct. 8, 2009 BGBL. I at 3366, 3862, last 
amended by Gesetz, Dec. 20, 2011 BGBL. I at 2592, § 10(1)(4).  Furthermore, contributions 
to churches made in excess of church tax liability are deductible under EStG § 10(b)(1) so 
long as the deduction does not exceed 5% of the donor’s income.  Id. § 10(b)(1). 
123. Petersen, supra note 105; Sticht, supra note 104. 
124. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of German citizens participate in the church tax system.  
See supra text accompanying note 110. 
125. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 603–04, 636–37. 
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German result does not obtain in a non-religious context in the United 
States, lack of constituent participation and funding nonetheless 
generates information about the preferred scope of representative 
spending. 
It bears repeating that the model must be secular.126  I say this not 
only because a sectarian version would violate the First Amendment, 
but also because the designation of religion as a denominator of tax 
jurisdiction would obscure constituents’ preferences about the scope of 
representative democratic spending power.  Under the current German 
system, individuals who support taxation for the provision of public 
goods must also choose membership in a religious organization that 
provides those goods.127  Individuals having a preference for the former 
position but not the latter are faced with two unsatisfactory choices: they 
can participate in the tax and join the taxing congregation, or they can 
fail to participate in the tax and avoid joining the congregation.  Neither 
of these options expresses the individual’s true preference for the reach 
of local government spending.128  By disaggregating participation and 
religious affiliation, adoption of a secular opt-out model to fund some 
non-essential spending would provide a wider range of expressive 
options to constituents. 
B.  Would Lack of Religious Impetus Destroy the Value of a Secular 
Model? 
Some may argue that once heaven and hell are removed from the 
taxing equation, any secular attempt to create an opt-out system will fail 
as a necessary consequence of free-riding.  This is simply not the case.  
Germany’s high church tax participation rate, when viewed in 
juxtaposition to its low religious participation rate, demonstrates that 
when faced with an avoidable tax, some people will choose to pay rather 
than avoid.129  Why do I care about this?  It suggests the possibility that if 
given the opportunity to make direct decisions about the scope of local 
government spending power, constituents may be expected to consider 
the merits of the question, rather than simply to avoid any cost to 
 
126. In addition to its normative undesirability, a religious model is prohibited by the 
First Amendment. 
127. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 636. 
128. See id.  For this reason, I suggest in a prior work that German states create non-
religious affiliation groups that correspond to religious ones.  Id. 
129. Id. at 603–04. 
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themselves on the basis of self-calculation and the plausibility of free-
riding.130  In other words, I argue that we should trust constituents, at 
least to the limited extent described in this proposal, to consider factors 
that are normatively relevant to the scope of representative local 
government’s non-essential spending power when making direct 
democratic decisions to either expand or limit that power. 
Empirical evidence on the use of ballot initiatives in the United 
States supports the position that constituents’ choices are grounded on 
considerations that extend beyond simple cost avoidance.131  Professor 
Matsusaka has examined fiscal effects of voter initiatives of the 
twentieth century and found that constituent access to the initiative 
process does not have a systematic effect on government size or 
expenditure.132  Rather, the combined expenditure of state and local 
governments with an initiative process was higher than that of those 
without it during the first half of the twentieth century, and it was lower 
during the latter half.133  Based on these data, it is possible to surmise 
that during the first half of the century, representatives were less 
responsive to constituent preferences for increased spending, whereas 
during the latter half of the century, following drastic expansion of 
government during war years, representatives were less responsive to 
constituent preferences for reduced spending.134  The resulting 
constituent response reveals, in turn, that voters are concerned with 
more than simply lowering their own tax liabilities.  These results are 
not consistent with the frequent assumption that voters will act self-
interestedly, avoiding any cost possible and free-riding if given the 
choice. 
Instead, the lack of any systematic effect described by Matsusaka’s 
data suggests that constituents weigh more than simple cost avoidance 
when making direct democratic decisions about taxes and spending.135  
 
130. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–35 (discussing how individuals behave in a 
cooperative rather than a self-calculating fashion when they believe that others do the same, 
and empirical evidence suggests that this response is stronger than the personal drive to 
maximize material wealth).  This is not to say that free-riders will not surface; they will.  But 
they do not seem to have been an overwhelming impediment in Germany. 
131. John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative in the First Half of the 
Twentieth Century, 43 J.L. & ECON. 619, 641 (2000).  
132. Id. at 622. 
133. Id.  
134. Id. at 641. 
135. Id. 
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To confirm this position, Matsusaka examined initiatives raised in 
California, North Dakota, and Oregon, which are the three most 
frequent users of the direct democratic process in the United States.136  
More often than not, voters in these states used the initiative process to 
increase government spending rather than to reduce it.137  Furthermore, 
several attempts to limit taxes and spending were defeated in these 
states.138  These results support the assertion that “the initiative’s main 
effect is to bring fiscal policy more in line with the electorate’s 
preferences.”139  Once again, the results do not depict voters as simple-
minded cost-avoiders. 
Matsusaka also found that state and local expenditures were more 
decentralized in jurisdictions with the initiative process than in those 
without it.140  In states with the initiative process, spending was more 
likely to occur at the local level than at the state level.141  This 
observation supports the assertion that constituents generally prefer 
fewer spending decisions at the state level and more at the local level.142 
Constituent desire for local input in spending decisions, coupled with 
the observation that constituents consider factors other than cost 
avoidance during the direct democratic process, lend credence to the use 
of the German church tax as a base model for constituent input on 
spending decisions in United States local governments.  As noted 
earlier, the German system is an imperfect example of opt-out finance 
as a direct democratic institution; it relies on religious affiliation as a 
denomination of tax jurisdiction, which impedes constituents’ expression 
of preferences.143  Consequently, the first step in creating a domestic 
model of opt-out public finance is to identify a neutral denominator of 
jurisdiction.  Since the model is meant for local governments that 
primarily provide geographically-bound goods and services, geography 
is the clearest, most rational denominator of jurisdiction, and I will 
 
136. Id. at 639–40. 
137. Id.  During the period of the study, twenty-one initiatives increased spending and 
eleven reduced it.  Id. 
138. Id. at 640. 
139. Id. at 641. 
140. Id. at 622. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 636. 
143. See supra Part III.A. 
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adopt it here.144  Second, the model must suggest appropriate subject 
matter for submission to the direct democratic decision-making process.  
Third, the model must describe the decision-making process.  Finally, it 
must also identify possible choices of revenue base.  The appropriate 
subject matter, decision-making process, and revenue base will vary 
according to the unique features and constituents of each locality.  
Consequently, I do not attempt to create a rigid structure that accounts 
for all aspects of local governance; rather, I hope to provide a useful set 
of observations that may be adapted to fit multiple circumstances. 
C.  Creating an Opt-Out System of Political Speech: Which Spending 
Decisions Are Most Appropriate for Direct Democracy? 
As noted earlier, in order to provide constituents with an 
opportunity to constructively participate in local tax and spending 
decisions, I propose that localities create packages of non-essential 
spending that constituents legally could refuse to support for any reason, 
including the desire to free-ride.  Like the church tax system in 
Germany, constituents would automatically be enrolled on the basis of 
chosen jurisdictional characteristics, such as place of residence or place 
of work.  Constituents could then exercise a right to opt out of the 
putative charges if they preferred.  In addition to rendering other 
benefits described below, this system would provide constituents with a 
means of directly participating in local governance without impinging 
upon essential governmental functions.  Furthermore, because 
constituents would have a defined format for making their preferences 
known, the likelihood of more intrusive direct democratic participation 
would be lessened, while direct democracy would nonetheless remain a 
potential check on the representative democratic process.145 
1. Which Spending Is Appropriate? 
Only certain kinds of spending are appropriate for inclusion in an 
opt-out form of direct democracy; namely, some excessive spending on 
essential government functions and some spending on non-essential 
government functions.  This assertion necessitates delineation of which 
 
144. Furthermore, failure to adopt a geographical model for the provision of public 
goods results in an unworkable libertarian utopia if taken to its logical conclusion.  Allowing 
an unbridled opt-out, untethered by geography, would essentially create a fee-for-services 
model of government. 
145. See infra Part III.C.4. 
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local government functions are essential and which are non-essential.  
To my great dismay, defining the term, “essential government function,” 
is an academic minefield.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, not 
only are most feasible definitions laden with political judgments, but the 
definition also must vary according to local government purpose, 
geography, constituent demography, and constituent  preferences.146  
Given the variance among local governments, it would be irresponsible 
to attempt to impart universal meaning or produce a static list of 
supposedly indispensable activities.147  For instance, a bright-line 
delineation between traditional government functions as essential and 
traditionally private pursuits as non-essential is not possible in light of 
public–private sector joint ventures, shifting norms, and local variance. 
In fact, in its effort to delineate the power of the federal government 
to tax and regulate the activities of state governments, the Supreme 
Court has moved away from drawing a sharp distinction between 
governmental activities and those of private business because the 
purportedly bright line between them is “too entangled in expediency to 
serve as a dependable legal criterion.”148  As a consequence, any federal 
attempt at creating a static definition of “essential governmental 
function” “inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make 
decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it 
dislikes.”149  Rather, as Justice Black wrote in Helvering v. Gerhardt, the 
identity of essential and non-essential functions is determined mainly by 
constituents themselves.150  He observed: 
 
There is not, and there cannot be, any unchanging line of 
demarcation between essential and non-essential governmental 
functions.  Many governmental functions of today have at some 
time in the past been non-governmental.  The genius of our 
 
146. See Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546–47 (1985) (holding that 
because governments must respond to constituent demands and because these demands 
change over time, federal courts should not employ a bright-line test to determine whether a 
particular function is essential). 
147. See id. 
148. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946). 
149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.  The Court added that a fixed standard must lead to 
“inconsistent results at the same time that it disserves principles of democratic self-
governance, and it breeds inconsistency precisely because it is divorced from those 
principles.”  Id. at 547. 
150. Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 427 (1938) (Black, J., concurring). 
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government provides that, within the sphere of constitutional 
action, the people—acting not through the courts but through 
their elected legislative representatives—have the power to 
determine as conditions demand, what services and functions the 
public welfare requires.151 
 
For purposes of our proposal, then, it is important to recognize that 
local governments engage in a gradient of activities.  Some of them are 
more important than others in various times and places, and their 
importance must be gauged on the local level in light of state and 
federal mandates.152  As a consequence, “essential” eludes a fixed 
definition for us just as it has for the Supreme Court.  The opposite side 
of the coin, “non-essential,” is similarly indefinite.  Consequently, I use 
the word “non-essential” to refer not to some static academic standard 
or list, but rather, to describe spending that is neither essential nor 
strictly within the explicit and implicit authority delegated to 
representatives by their constituents.153  In other words, “non-essential” 
will function as the flip side of a flexibly defined “essential,” meant to 
account for the variations in local government engendered by our 
federal system. 
As a starting point for our definition, let us assume that all state and 
federal statutory mandates imposed upon localities are essential 
government functions.154  Although they may not fit within our 
colloquial understanding of what is “essential,” these obligations are the 
result of superior governmental power, and subjecting them to direct 
democratic approval at the local level makes little sense.155  I propose 
 
151. Id. 
152. See id. at 427. 
153. Professor Reynolds has also adopted this approach, albeit less explicitly.  She 
convincingly argues that funding goods and services important to the “general welfare” 
through the widespread use of fees is inappropriate.  Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88.  She 
adds that local government’s use of fees should be restrained by “commonly accepted values 
about the government’s obligation to provide essential services and deeply held convictions 
about the public benefit of those services.”  Id. at 388. 
154. For one example of a federal mandate affecting a municipality, see Jeremy Olshan, 
$27 Million to Change NYC Signs from All-Caps, N.Y. POST, Sept. 30, 2010, http://www. 
nypost.com/p/news/local/bronx/million_kuj8X4Z2VolVhXnCymfkvM (stating that, for safety 
reasons, federal guidelines require city to change street names on signs from all capital letters 
to capital and lower case letters). 
155. “Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State, created as 
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the State as may be 
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two criteria for determining whether remaining government functions 
are essential and therefore not eligible for approval or disapproval in an 
opt-out form of direct democracy.  First, an essential government 
function is one that is provided primarily by the government.  Although 
private providers may exist, the bulk of citizens depend upon the 
government for the particular good or service in question.  For instance, 
although some citizens may hire private security, most rely on the 
police.  As a result, the police function falls within the first criterion of 
my definition. 
The first criterion cannot be the only criterion though.  If it were, 
anything that the government chose to co-opt would become an 
essential government function.156  Consequently, I propose a second 
criterion.  At the local level, an essential government function also must 
be one that is protected or provided for (although not necessarily 
mandated) by state or federal statute.  For instance, the provision of 
schools, roads, and a police force are generally mandated and regulated 
by state law.  In contrast, a local government may be the region’s sole 
provider of sundaes at the local bandstand, but lack of a related state 
statutory provision removes this function from the essential function 
category.  I rely on state statutes from superior legislative bodies and 
predominant provisions by local government as indicia of both necessity 
and overall public will for the provision of public goods and services.157  
It bears repeating that public will is far from irrelevant as a criterion for 
determining whether a government function is essential.  As I have 
 
entrusted to them. . . .  The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon 
[them] . . . rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”  Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 
161, 178 (1907).  Federal and state governmental supremacy has a direct impact on the scope 
of action required of or permitted to municipal governments.  See MANDELKER ET AL., supra 
note 1, at 26, 33 (stating state legislatures have plenary powers to act unless limited by the 
federal or state constitution, whereas the power of local governments are not plenary but 
instead are “delegated by the state”). 
156. Of course, it is possible to argue that rather than government co-option of private 
functions, the true danger to constituents is private co-option of governmental function.  I do 
not believe this to be a viable argument in the context of direct democracy.  While it is 
possible for the government to seize a private function without the express consent of its 
constituents, the reverse is not true.  The presence of significant private provision of a 
formerly public good or service requires consent by a requisite number of people required for 
economic viability.  This is not to suggest that local government should or should not continue 
to provide a good or service that is also privately provided; rather, it should no longer be 
viewed as “essential.” 
157. This is because the state statutes come into being through a deliberative process of 
debate and compromise by officials who are elected by the broader public. 
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described above, if one believes that direct democratic incursion on 
governmental functions is more likely to occur when representatives 
have imposed high costs on constituents while also acting outside of the 
bounds of constituent expectations, the determination of whether a 
spending item falls within the authority implicitly delegated to 
representatives by constituents is important. 
In essence, my proposal would create a mechanism through which 
representatives could ask constituents for broader boundaries of 
spending authority.  The proposal would apply to two categories of 
spending: (1) excessive spending on essential functions, and (2) all 
spending on selected non-essential functions.  For an example of the 
first category, consider once again the local police force.158  Most people 
agree that providing a police force is a core activity of local government, 
and indeed, it meets both criteria of my definition of essential 
governmental function.159  But is all spending related to this function 
necessarily essential government spending?  Here, the consensus breaks 
down.  For example, in most parts of the country, most people will agree 
that providing the police force with cars is a necessary expense, but 
should those cars be unmitigated jalopies?  Used Ford Crown Royals?  
New Bentleys?  The example demonstrates that it is possible to have 
non-essential government spending on an essential governmental 
function.  These kinds of spending would be appropriate for inclusion in 
an opt-out system, provided that they meet the other criteria described 
below.  Of course, a similar inquiry into the nature of spending is not 
necessary for non-essential government functions.  For purposes of this 
proposal, all spending on a non-essential government function is non-
 
158. Even famous libertarian Robert Nozick believed that the police force was essential 
for the protection of private rights in property.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, 
AND UTOPIA 149–55 (1974) (explaining that the state requires minimal police force and other 
minimal powers to secure private property rights). 
159. See, e.g., Booth, supra note 3 (stating that the city will soon be without many 
services citizens consider basic, including a cut of more than $5.5 million in police and 
firefighting that will result in many vacant positions); see also Keith Eddings, Car Thefts 
Skyrocket in Lawrence After Police Layoffs, EAGLE TRIB. (N. Andover, Mass.), Aug. 15, 
2010, at B3 (noting citizens have complained that cutting officers is the wrong move in this 
economy because people may try to take advantage of the shortage); Nicholas J.C. Pistor, 
East St. Louis Cuts Include Almost Third of Police Force, ST. LOUIS POST–DISPATCH 
(Jul. 31, 2010, 12:25 AM), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/east-st-louis-
cuts-include-almost-third-of-police-force/article_328f01fc-6e92-55fc-89c2-4794e0c5a575.html 
(discussing that the city faced a loss of nearly a third of its police force and that citizens are 
concerned for public safety considering the area’s high crime rate). 
09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:27 PM 
2011–2012] REDIRECTING DIRECT DEMOCRACY 599 
 
essential spending. 
2. Why Do Constituents’ Expectations Matter? 
As described in Part IV below, I propose delegating decision-making 
authority over certain “non-essential spending” to constituents.160  This 
raises a new question: why should we care about constituents’ 
expectations of their representative government?  After all, state 
statutes grant broad powers to local governments, and one may argue 
that the election process weeds out tone-deaf representatives who act in 
unexpected ways.161  However, this argument assumes that local 
constituencies have adequate information about the actions of 
individual representatives and that they will voluntarily participate in 
local elections.  In most municipal and county elections, these 
assumptions simply are not true.162  Rather, most constituents have 
relatively little input in local elections, and most representatives have 
relatively little information about the preferences of their constituents.163 
Lack of information on both sides of the local government equation 
is troubling.164  In the aggregate, constituents’ expectations of 
representatives are directly relevant to the scope of local government 
spending.165  This is true for two reasons.  First, it is constituents 
 
160. For purposes of this proposal, I define “non-essential spending” as spending on 
items that are provided primarily by the local government and which is either mandated by 
state or federal statue or is clearly within constituents’ expectations.  See supra Part III.C.1. 
161. But see Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (discussing how local elections are less 
competitive and representatives face only binary voting, so electoral politics alone may be 
insufficient to prevent representative government from acting in contravention of constituent 
preferences). 
162. See id.; Garrett & McCubbins, supra note 68, at 47 (noting example of local voters 
who often lacked the requisite information to make decisions consistent with their own 
interests); Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (discussing how local elections are less competitive 
and representatives face only binary voting, so electoral politics alone may be insufficient to 
prevent representative government from acting in contravention of constituent preferences). 
163. See Gordon, supra note 58, at 33 (stating that empirical analysis supports assertion 
that representatives’ uncertainty about voter preferences increases with increasing size of the 
jurisdiction, increasing number of unaffiliated voters, and decreasing residential stability); 
Brian D. Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 26–27 (Fla. St. Univ. C.L., Pub. L. 
Res. Paper No. 394, 2011), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473107 
(arguing that lobbying will affect whose voices are heard by representatives and how 
representatives choose to distribute resources). 
164. See Kang, supra note 68, at 1143 (stating that voters are commonly criticized as 
ignorant and not competent to make choices in their own best interest). 
165. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (arguing that choice between use of tax 
revenues or fees per service as means of funding government-provided goods should be 
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themselves who imbue the representative process with legitimacy.  
Elected officials, if they truly represent constituents, must stand in the 
constituents’ stead when they act in an official capacity, even during the 
process of debate and compromise.  The scope and legitimacy of that 
action necessarily depends on the consent of the governed.166  Perhaps a 
formalist view of the situation would insist that expectations do not 
matter because the constituents have consented, de facto, to the exercise 
of any local government power granted by state statute or constitution.  
After all, they control the creation of such powers through other 
democratic processes such as the election of state representatives or 
exercise of the initiative power.167  This argument fails, however, because 
it ignores the unique features of individual localities.  A spending 
decision that is fully legitimate in light of the expectations of one city’s 
constituents may be completely illegitimate in light of the expectations 
of another city’s constituents even though both decisions may be 
permissible uses of local government funds under state law.168  Notice 
that the distinction between these two instances of spending is not a 
clearly defined line; rather, it is a gradient of acceptability.  Employing 
my proposal would cover some of the distance necessary to determine 
the boundaries of that gradient. 
The relevance of constituent preferences to the available gradient of 
representative spending decisions is best demonstrated by example.  For 
instance, Ohio law provides that municipalities may provide funding and 
other assistance to park districts.169  Almost no one would question the 
 
determined with reference to “commonly accepted values about the government’s obligation 
to provide essential services and deeply held convictions about the public benefit of those 
services”).  
166. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“[A]ll power derives 
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they create.”); see 
also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”). 
167. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (stating that the scope of local 
government power is determined solely by delegation of state constitution or legislative 
grant). 
168. For instance, it is perfectly reasonable for the City of Chicago to expand its system 
of public transit, whereas such a decision would not be reasonable in my hometown of Berlin 
Heights, Ohio, which had a population of roughly 700 people in the 2010 U.S. Census.  See 
Profile of General Population and Housing Characteristics: Berlin Heights Village, Ohio, U.S. 
CENSUS BUR., http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml? 
pid=DEC_10_DP_DPDP1&prodType=table (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 715.211 (LexisNexis 2008). 
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authority of a representative local government to fund a reasonably 
sized park, lawn care, landscaping, and even athletic fields.  But what 
about, for example, a zoo?  A zoo is most certainly a park, but the 
legitimacy of a local government’s decision to fund a zoo will depend on 
constituent preferences despite the fact that the decision is sanctioned 
by state statute.  When voting for representatives, the electorate of a 
small rural city would never contemplate the founding of a zoo as being 
within the scope of their representatives’ authority at the time of 
election, whereas the electorate of a larger city could foresee the 
possibility of such a decision and therefore could take it into account 
when choosing representatives.  It would be a heroic stretch to say that 
representatives of both cities are authorized by their constituents to 
fund a zoo simply because state law permits it. 
Next, consider a city’s choice to fund the zoo’s acquisition of a rare 
and endangered animal, such as a panda bear.  The enormous expense 
of acquiring the animal and creating a suitable habitat and plan of 
maintenance might exceed even the expected range of activity for 
representatives in a large city.  Even though representatives who made 
this choice would be acting within the bounds of their statutory 
authority, two things are very likely to be true.  First, acquisition of a 
panda bear, while related to an essential government function, the 
provision of parks, is almost certainly a non-essential expense.  Second, 
while representatives may consider the acquisition of a panda bear 
advantageous to the city, they will not know constituents’ aggregate 
preferences about the use of tax dollars to fund such an acquisition 
because the purchase was unexpected at the time of election and 
therefore not subject to debate by constituents.  Unless representatives 
ask constituents directly about the expense, their purchase will represent 
a sheer guess at the scope of their authority to spend public money on a 
non-essential item.  That is not to say that purchase of the bear is bad or 
will produce disutility, only that it is so far beyond the expected course 
of government action that it could not be described as representative in 
the colloquial sense.170 
I provide this example not as a demonstration of which expenses 
 
170. One can imagine a number of other examples; perhaps a Magna Charta for the 
local library, Audis for the police force, and a golf course designed by the now-infamous 
Tiger Woods.  Each of these expenses falls within the scope of activities permitted by the 
state constitutional and statutory grants of municipal power.  It is clear, however, that these 
expenditures are not essential.    
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should be included in a system of opt-out public finance, but rather to 
highlight the fact that constituent preferences are directly relevant to the 
legitimacy of a particular local expenditure, even if that expenditure is 
unquestionably legal in light of the state constitution and statutes.  If a 
particular government expenditure cannot be anticipated by 
constituents as a response to the circumstances that generated the 
government’s choice, we might question whether the expenditure falls 
within the authority delegated by constituents to their representatives.  
If not, the expenditure may be appropriate for a direct democratic 
decision-making process.  Since this is the case, I conclude that 
aggregate constituent preferences regarding the bounds of 
representative authority should be considered when determining 
whether a particular expenditure is non-essential and therefore 
appropriate for the opt-out form of direct democracy described in this 
Article. 
Of course, my position is subject to criticism.  It would not be 
entirely misguided to argue that the representative democratic process is 
theoretically self-correcting; speaking proverbially, voters can kick the 
bums out.171  Furthermore, it is clear that aggregate constituent 
preferences should be ignored if they would impinge on essential 
government functions.172  Neither point detracts from the vitality of my 
proposal.  It is possible for successive administrations of elected officials 
to systematically flout constituents’ implicit expectations about the 
scope of local government, particularly in areas where constituents have 
insufficient or incorrect information, or where constituent participation 
in local elections is low.173  The passage of Proposition 13 and many 
other direct democratic limitations on government’s taxing power may 
suggest that where taxes and spending are involved, representative 
democratic processes have historically turned a blind eye to 
constituents’ preferences.  Furthermore, it is entirely possible that 
representatives wish to respect, but do not know, constituent 
 
171. But see Gillette, supra note 22, at 1252 (arguing that local elections are less 
competitive, making the electoral check on representatives less effective); Leib, supra note 
52, at 905 (noting that representatives have perverse incentive to pander to interests of 
wealthy campaign donors). 
172. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (asserting the importance of protecting 
essential services that are important to the general welfare). 
173. See supra Part II. 
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preferences regarding the bounds of government authority.174  The opt-
out mechanism envisioned by my proposal relieves pressure on the 
constituent–representative relationship in either instance. 
3. Who Should Have the Power to Designate Non-Essential Expenses 
for Inclusion in an Opt-Out System: Government, Constituents, or 
State? 
a.  Local Government Possesses Sufficient Information 
My proposal, that local governments allow constituents to make 
direct choices about certain items of non-essential spending, is intended 
to foster a new balance between representative and direct democratic 
decisions in local government spending.  Specifically, allowing 
constituents to directly address spending decisions that fall at or beyond 
the boundaries of constituents’ implicit delegation of power to 
representatives will lessen the likelihood of a power grab by constituents 
through ballot initiative or similar processes.175  In other words, this 
proposal should apply only to non-essential spending, as it is described 
above.  Allowing constituents to directly influence decisions about 
reasonable spending for essential government functions would 
jeopardize the processes of deliberation, planning, and compromise that 
protect political minorities from the tyranny of the majority.176  As a 
consequence, I cannot emphasize strongly enough that only those items 
of spending that will not jeopardize citizens’ access to essential 
government services and protections should be subjected to the 
proposed decision-making process.177 
As described above, for purposes of this proposal, an expense is 
essential when it is reasonable in amount, reasonably related to a 
governmental function that is elucidated by state statute, and primarily 
provided by the local government.178  An expense is clearly non-essential 
 
174. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 427 (delegation of decision-making authority on 
government spending may be desirable when constituents have knowledge superior to that of 
the legislative body). 
175. See infra Part IV.B. 
176. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294, 299–300 (arguing that ballot initiatives may 
be used to disadvantage minorities, and unlike legislation, they provide no opportunity for 
deliberation and compromise).  
177. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 387–88 (asserting the importance of protecting 
essential services that are important to the general welfare). 
178. See supra Part III.C.1. 
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when it does not meet this definition and falls outside of the authority 
delegated by constituents to their representatives either explicitly or 
implicitly.179  In other words, if a particular government expenditure 
cannot be anticipated by constituents as a response to the circumstances 
surrounding the local government’s choice, representatives should 
question whether the expenditure falls within their delegated authority.  
In such a case, representatives may seek constituent input through the 
direct democratic decision-making process.  For instance, no one would 
question a representative local government’s decision to collect 
residents’ yard waste.180  This activity encourages sanitary conditions and 
increases property value at little cost to taxpayers.  To take it one step 
further, few people would object to a local government’s decision to 
purchase wood chippers for the purpose of turning yard waste into 
mulch.  This decision is a logical corollary to the collection of yard 
waste.  But how would residents react to a costly expenditure for dump 
trucks used to deliver the resulting mulch to any resident for free?  
Constituents’ reactions to this gradient of spending will vary by locality.  
While not as outrageous as our prior example, the small town zoo, the 
cost of delivering free mulch is not likely to be essential and may be 
appropriate to include a group of expenses for direct democratic 
approval.  In the absence of an omniscient and communicative third 
party, representatives themselves are in the best position to observe 
local preferences and decide which expenses may be non-essential.181 
b.  Constituents Have Insufficient Information 
Although it may appear suboptimal to trust this decision to the body 
whose judgment constituents have historically distrusted, a second 
option—letting constituents designate non-essential spending—makes 
 
179. See supra Part III.C.1. 
180. See Mark Ferenchik, Yard Waste a Community Effort: Even if City Service Returns, 
Residents Plan to Continue Sharing Burden of Disposal, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 25, 
2009), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2009/03/25/leafbags.ART_ART_03-25-
09_B1_L1DBIMV.html (stating that more than 1000 residents called the city to complain 
after the service was halted); Robert Vitale, Columbus Will Resume Collecting Yard Waste: 
Council Approval Means Pickup Will Start in Mid-April, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 23, 
2010, at B1 (noting that yard waste collection resumed after revocation of service was deemed 
the most unpopular budget cut of 2009). 
181. See Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 
1673–74 (2007) (arguing that smaller governments can provide legislation that more closely 
fits the preferences of constituents). 
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even less sense.  First, representatives can aggregate information on the 
preferences of constituents in a way that is not possible for constituents 
themselves.182  Although representatives may not know constituents’ 
views on a particular expenditure (free delivery of mulch, for instance), 
the lack of knowledge itself is an important piece of information 
indicating that a particular expenditure may be a good fit for opt-out 
financing.  In contrast, allowing constituents to designate expenditures 
subject to direct democratic decision-making would expand the very 
tendency that this proposal seeks to cabin, the tendency to interfere with 
essential government functions.  Finally, even if we disregard the first 
two assertions, lack of effective coordination would prevent constituents 
from designating non-essential spending.  In essence, constituents would 
have to vote on what to vote on.  The process simply would be too 
unwieldy to enact. 
c.  State Government Has Insufficient Information, Resources, and 
Flexibility 
A third option for designating non-essential expenditures eligible for 
inclusion in an opt-out system—allowing states to choose them—raises 
similar problems.  It is unlikely that the state will possess adequate 
information to make informed choices about local non-essential 
spending.183  If the state acts statutorily to create a one-size-fits-all 
package of non-essential spending eligible for inclusion in an opt-out 
system, the designated items will only mesh with local constituent 
preferences if the state is largely homogenous.  Furthermore, these 
provisions, once statutorily enshrined, will be unlikely to change in 
response to changes in localities and may become quickly outdated.184  
Finally, it is not feasible for most states to address the issue individually 
for each locality; the work load simply would be too great.  As a result, 
lodging designatory power at the state level makes no more sense than 
granting it to constituents.  The representative governments of 
 
182. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that the public 
“lacks the ability to collect and to study information that is utilized routinely by legislative 
bodies”), rev’d en banc, Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997). 
183. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1255 (explaining that state actions regarding local tax 
and spending decisions may be “lumpy and sticky,” made in response to the interests of state 
legislators rather than local constituents, and may interfere with the local government’s 
function “without producing any offsetting benefit”). 
184. Id. 
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individual localities are best situated to choose which expenses to 
include in an opt-out system. 
4. Structuring Direct Democracy to Best Reveal Preferences 
A workable opt-out structure must address criticisms of the use of 
direct democracy, and particularly its use for proportionate decision-
making in public finance.  Most of these concerns, which are fully 
described in Part IV, can be alleviated by creating a structure similar to 
the German church tax that allows constituents to weigh in at any time, 
with full information about both the proposed spending and the actions 
of other constituents.185  Therefore, I propose that local representative 
governments, after identifying suitable proposed expenses, 
automatically enroll constituents as contributors to those expenses 
subject to the participation base discussion below.  Constituents, who 
would then be “voluntary taxpayers,” to employ an oxymoron, could opt 
out of their contributions by filing a signed writing with the appropriate 
authority.186  As I discuss below, the proportional aspect of this system 
would necessitate further consideration of the expenses chosen for 
inclusion, but it would provide a more complete picture of constituents’ 
delegation of non-essential spending power to representatives.187  In 
addition, it would provide constituents with a novel outlet for political 
speech.  In the paragraphs that follow, I outline criticisms of direct 
democratic decision-making in public finance found in the existing 
literature and explain how the structure of my proposed system avoids 
many of these pitfalls. 
 
185. German churches levy a tax against their members that is generally collected 
through wage withholding.  See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 603–05 (describing German church 
tax laws and customs).  Members can avoid this tax by renouncing membership in the taxing 
congregation, which they are permitted to do for any reason and at any time.  Id. at 605. 
Church membership rolls are not disclosed to the public.  See id. at 603. 
186. I would include signed electronic writings in this category, although use of the 
internet has not yet been approved for voting.  I presume that the legality of an internet opt-
out would vary from state to state. 
187. For a discussion of which expenses are appropriate for inclusion, see supra Part 
III.C.   
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IV.  CRITICISMS AND THE STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS THAT ADDRESS 
THEM 
A.  Tyranny of the Majority 
One important criticism of direct democracy is that its reliance on 
majority rule runs roughshod over concerns of the political minority, 
which are better provided for by the deliberation and compromise 
process of representative democracy.188  For instance, in direct 
democracy, one can imagine a large number of citizens without wealth 
supporting high taxes to extract money from a wealthy few.  Conversely, 
one could imagine a large number of wealthy citizens supporting low 
taxes to avoid redistribution to those who are less wealthy.189  In either 
situation, the political minority has little power over its own destiny, 
despite the use of democratic processes meant to afford each citizen an 
equal voice.190  This is problematic, particularly in the second scenario, 
where direct democratic opposition to taxes could impede the provision 
of essential government functions to citizens who are unable to purchase 
substitutes like private security or schools.191 
My proposal addresses this problem in three ways.  First, it applies 
only to non-essential spending, which protects constituents who are 
unable to provide private substitutes for that spending.  Second, as 
Professor Stark has suggested, majority rule can be limited by 
permitting the representative democratic government to put boundaries 
on the direct democratic process.192  For instance, a referendum created 
 
188. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294 (arguing that ballot initiatives may be used 
to disadvantage minorities); Stark, supra note 9, at 208 (“Majorities misbehave, and there is 
reason to institutionalize procedures to limit such mischief.”).  
189. See Gillette, supra note 22, at 1245 (stating that “disparate treatment of taxes and 
fees implies a distrustful view of redistribut[ion]” at the municipal level); Reynolds, supra 
note 17, at 375 (“[A]ffluent, homogeneous enclaves are able to capture the wealth within 
their borders and tax it only to serve the needs of their similarly situated neighbors.”).  
190. See Clark, supra note 52, at 442 (indicating that voting systems are means to allow 
people to participate in crafting the government, and no one voter should have more 
influence than any other voter). 
191. See Chemerinsky, supra note 62, at 294 (arguing that ballot issues may be used to 
disadvantage minorities); Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit 
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC THEORY 171, 
185 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975) (stating that at higher levels of income, constituents 
supplement or substitute public goods with private ones, such as home and business security 
systems, home trash compactors, and electronic air filters to provide a cleaner environment). 
192. Stark, supra note 9, at 209 (in a referendum, direct democracy essentially acts as a 
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by the legislature is far more likely to be the product of deliberation and 
compromise than a ballot initiative instigated by an interest group or 
voters.193  My proposal adopts this strategy by allowing representatives 
to identify non-essential spending that will be included in the opt-out 
package.  Third, and importantly, the opt-out system is not an all-or-
nothing proposition.  Rather, it allows for proportional decision-making, 
which provides voters in the political minority with direct and 
meaningful input.194 
B.  Proportional Decision-Making Is Not Indicative of Public Choice 
A second potential critique of the opt-out system is that its financial 
result may not be indicative of public choice.  On the subject of 
proportional tax voting, Professor Levmore has observed that although 
a particular constituent can control whether or not he contributes to a 
given expenditure, he has no say in the overall level of funding raised for 
a particular item.195  As a result, a constituent’s contribution can produce 
the constituent’s preferred level of funding only by accident.196  For 
instance, assume that a representative local government decides to seek 
constituent approval for the cost of landscaping a park that is currently a 
wild meadow.  The cost of fully landscaping the park will be $100,000, 
and the locality has 10,000 constituents.  Each constituent will be 
charged $10 unless he or she opts out of the payment.  Now assume that 
60% of the residents would prefer no landscaping.  The remaining 40% 
are in favor of granting representatives full authority to make the 
$100,000 expenditure.  Out of these, 10% are in favor of any level of 
landscaping, but the remainder are in favor of landscaping only if the 
 
“democratic filter over and above that offered by the representative processes”). 
193. See Jones v. Bates, 127 F.3d 839, 860 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that the public 
“lacks the ability to collect and to study information that is utilized routinely by legislative 
bodies”), rev’d  en banc, Bates v. Jones, 131 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 1997); see also Robinson, supra 
note 25, at 543 (indicating that “legislative fiscal policy-making . . . is an iterative process,” yet 
it is not easy for constituents to consider the cumulative effect of a series of ballot initiatives). 
194. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 398–99 (noting that proportional voting seemingly 
provides a policy result that is proportionate to constituents’ enthusiasm, although it may 
impose external costs not inherent in traditional voting where a minority funds a project that 
is not favored by the majority). 
195. See id. at 394–95 (noting that the check-off for federal election campaign funding 
found on federal income tax return forms could only produce the public’s preferred amount 
of funding by accident since no single voter has information about any other voter’s actions).  
196. Id. at 394 (noting that without knowledge of other voters’ choices, a constituent 
may inadvertently overfund a particular item against her preference). 
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full $100,000 is committed to the project. 
In the scenario above, a simple opt-out system produces a highly 
flawed result.  If 60% of constituents who prefer the unlandscaped 
meadow opt out of the $10 payment, the resulting $40,000 of revenue 
may still permit the government to landscape the park, leaving these 
constituents dissatisfied.  Furthermore, the 30% of constituents who 
wanted $100,000 of landscaping are also dissatisfied, even though they 
contributed to the cause.  They view the project as underfunded and 
therefore substandard.  In the end, only 10% of constituents are happy 
with the result of proportional tax voting in this example.197  
This conundrum may be addressed by refining the role of the 
representative government in the proposal.  In the example above, the 
representative government has forwarded a fixed-budget capital project 
for approval.  While I certainly do not discourage seeking other forms of 
voter input on this kind of project, capital expenditures are not ideal for 
an opt-out funding format for two reasons.  First, partial completion of a 
capital project is never satisfactory, but a representative government can 
never obtain anything more than partial funding through opt-out 
financing.  Second, capital undertakings require voter approval at a 
specific point in time.  The project must be approved at the outset, 
which means that each constituent must cast his or her vote without any 
information about what others have done.198  As a result, the example 
produces a nonsensical outcome. 
The problems identified above can be avoided by narrowing the 
kinds of spending subjected to the opt-out regime and by increasing 
representative government input in the choices presented to voters.  
First, representatives should identify spending that is recurring rather 
than capital in nature.  Second, the identified spending should also fall 
into the “more is better” category.  For instance, rather than subjecting 
the cost of park development to the opt-out process, representatives 
could choose the cost of showing outdoor movies in the park.  This is 
clearly a non-essential expense that, depending upon the locality, may 
fall outside of the usual scope of governmental spending authority.199  
 
197. Another example may be the construction of a public monument that would inspire 
some but offend many others. 
198. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95 (noting that without knowledge of other 
constituents’ actions, constituents can only vote in favor of their preferred funding level by 
accident). 
199. In other words, one can imagine some residents asking why the local government is 
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Furthermore, most people would agree that, within a reasonable range, 
it is better to have more movies than fewer. 
1. Setting a Floor and a Ceiling 
In addition to choosing appropriate expenses for inclusion in the 
opt-out system, the representative government must play an additional 
role in my proposal: determining the acceptable range of revenue 
necessary to fund the non-essential item.  It is possible to identify a 
plethora of more-is-better spending that might be undertaken by local 
governments.  Pancake breakfasts, free trees on Arbor Day, cooking 
classes, the provision of sports equipment, evening concerts, and many 
other things initially seem better in bulk.  However, upon closer 
examination, this is not necessarily the case.  Let us return for a moment 
to movies in the park.  Assume that a representative local government 
forwards movies in the park as an item of non-essential spending to be 
approved through the opt-out system.  If all but a few constituents opt 
out, perhaps the locality will screen one movie but will not be 
authorized to show more.  If all constituents remain enrolled rather than 
opting out, the government may raise more money than is practical.  
Does this mean that the representative government should show double 
features every night?  Surely not. 
Because it is possible for constituents in an opt-out system to under 
or oversubscribe to a particular discretionary expense, the 
representative local government should choose a pre-set spending limit 
and spending floor.200  These levels, above which the funded activity is a 
nuisance, and below which it is futile, should be presented to 
constituents along with a description of the activity in which the locality 
seeks to engage.  When funds are raised above or below these limits, 
they should be remitted to constituents or applied to constituents’ other 
liabilities to the representative government. 
2. Replacing a Fixed Voting Date with a Rolling Opt-Out 
Placing a pre-set ceiling and floor on discretionary spending does not 
completely solve the problem described in our park example above.  
 
wasting their tax dollars on a free showing of Jersey Girl. 
200. See Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95 (noting that unless constituents are fully 
informed of others’ actions, they can only reach an appropriate level of funding 
inadvertently).  This problem is cured in the opt-out system described here because 
constituents can choose to participate or not on a rolling basis. 
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Although set points inform constituents of the range of funding with 
which a project will go forward, a pre-set range may not correspond with 
any individual constituent’s preferred range.  For instance, imagine a 
constituent who would prefer between two and four outdoor movies but 
who has an intense preference against a fifth movie or more.  Now, 
imagine that this constituent’s representative local government has 
designated a range of funding that would provide between four and six 
outdoor movies.  If all constituents have only one opportunity to either 
remain enrolled or opt out, our imaginary constituent will not know 
which choice will result in four movies rather than six.  However, if 
constituents are permitted to make their decisions on a rolling basis, our 
imaginary subject can wait to see what others do before making her own 
decision. 
A rolling opt-out also allows constituents to respond to changes in 
circumstance, whereas a single vote taken on a fixed date would not.  
This means, of course, that local governments could not rely on future 
funding for expenses included in the opt-out system and would be 
unable to budget for them.  I do not find this troubling, since the 
expenses that I have identified as appropriate fall into the “want” rather 
than the “need” category and are not capital in nature.  By setting a 
floor and ceiling and by allowing a rolling opt-out, localities can avoid 
the nonsensical outcome reached in the park example above.  
Furthermore, this additional input from the representative government 
will ensure that revenue collected through the opt-out system is 
plausibly linked to the actual preferences of constituents. 
3. Choice of Participation Base 
Having narrowed the range of expenses eligible for inclusion in an 
opt-out system, it becomes necessary to ask who will bear the burden of 
those expenses.  Two specific questions must be answered.  First, should 
participation in the opt-out system include individuals who reside 
outside of a local government’s taxing jurisdiction but work within it?  
And second, should participation in the opt-out system be confined to 
constituents who pay taxes, or should it be extended more broadly?  For 
the reasons explained below, localities should answer both questions by 
including as many participants as possible. 
a.  Should Participation Be Confined to Residents of the Charging 
Jurisdiction? 
One frequent criticism of direct democracy in the tax and spending 
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context is that it allows residents of one locality to shift a tax burden that 
is rightfully theirs to residents of another locality who have no right to 
vote on the increase.201  For instance, rationally acting residents who live 
in a central city that serves as a hub for commuters should always vote in 
favor of increased income taxes on wages earned within the city limits.202  
The amount of revenue collected from non-residents will exceed that 
collected from residents, leaving the city with a net gain.  Furthermore, 
because non-residents do not vote for representatives of the city 
government, they have no say in how the city uses those funds.  The 
same situation may arise with respect to sales taxes that will affect 
shoppers from neighboring localities, or property taxes that will be 
levied on vacation homes.203 
The examples above assume that the relationship between 
commuters and residents of the central city is rationally adversarial.  
Theoretically, commuters want to use the resources of the city without 
contributing to them.  Conversely, city dwellers want to extract 
resources from commuters.  But this may not always be the case.  
Because commuters use and enjoy the central city for work, it is entirely 
reasonable to make the opposite assumption: that commuters want to 
contribute resources for the betterment of the central city, and that city 
dwellers will use additional resources in a way that makes the city 
attractive to both commuters and residents.  An opt-out system 
applicable to both residents and commuters permits this non-adversarial 
relationship to develop by allowing both groups to contribute jointly to 
non-essential spending that will benefit both groups.  In addition, use of 
the opt-out system addresses a small portion of commuters’ 
disenfranchisement in tax voting by allowing them to express their 
 
201. Stark, supra note 9, at 195 (noting that the “chief distinguishing feature” of local 
taxation is that some taxpayers will be unable to participate in the democratic decision-
making process by reason of their residence in another locality). 
202. Even delegates at the federal constitutional convention were concerned that direct 
democratic voting by a low-wealth majority would threaten the individual property interests 
of the high-wealth minority.  See Eule, supra note 57, at 1542. 
203. See Stark, supra note 9, at 195 (noting that individuals’ mobility between local 
jurisdictions, and their resulting inability to participate in tax decisions that affect them, 
“highlights the weakness of the referendum as a yardstick of taxpayer consent”); see also 
Denzau et al., supra note 59, at 198 (stating that economic modeling suggests that voters may 
support spending limitations at one level of government if they perceive that doing so will 
export that burden to another level of government). 
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preferences alongside those of residents.204  Commuters who are 
troubled by the fact that they are not permitted to participate in 
representative government elections, or by any other aspect of the opt-
out charge, can simply and legally refuse to pay.  For these reasons, 
localities should err on the side of inclusion rather than exclusion. 
b.  Should Participation in the Opt-Out System Be Confined to 
Taxpayers, or Should It Include All Constituents? 
Localities adopting the opt-out system face a second question of 
inclusion: whether to bill all constituents or limit liability solely to those 
who already pay a recognized form of tax.  Traditional tax policy 
considerations of equity, efficiency, and simplicity initially suggest that 
the opt-out system should apply only to taxpayers.  These individuals 
have already been allocated a portion of the public burden on the basis 
of sufficient property ownership, consumption, or income, and 
piggybacking the opt-out system on current tax collection mechanisms is 
likely to save government time and resources.  However, such 
efficiencies produce a poor result in this context because they 
disenfranchise would-be voters who are not taxpayers.205  Because the 
opt-out system should be envisioned as a means of political speech 
rather than a means of raising revenue, considerations of equal voice 
must trump the tax policy analysis. 
Of course, it may be argued (though not by me) that 
disenfranchisement in this context is a superficial problem.  If local 
governments confine the opt-out system to non-essential spending, 
failure to make the proposed expenditure will not result in failure to 
provide the government’s usual goods and services.  Rather, a mass opt-
out by uncooperative taxpayers will merely prevent the local 
government from providing “bonus” goods and services.  Because 
essential services and other services ordinarily provided by the 
 
204. Here I note a potential inconsistency in the theoretical underpinnings of my 
proposal.  If using opt-out financing allows constituents (meaning “residents”) to better 
express their preferences regarding the scope of representatives’ non-essential spending, 
injection of non-residents into the system will distort the desired outcome.  I resolve this 
matter by asserting that, in the scenario described above, both commuters and residents are 
“constituents” of the representative government.  Both groups contribute funds to the 
representative government, and the government must consider both groups when making 
decisions about infrastructure, taxes, spending, and other considerations.  
205. Staudt, supra note 11, at 566–67; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 388 (noting 
that where only taxpayers are permitted to vote, “[s]uffrage is restricted”). 
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government would not be disrupted, the expectations of non-taxpaying 
residents would be protected.  In addition, because funds collected 
through the opt-out system are as much like voluntary charitable 
contributions as they are like taxes, it is not normatively clear that the 
entire constituency should have a say in their eventual use. 
A much stronger argument exists, however, for making the inclusion 
of constituents as broad as possible.206  If we view the opt-out system not 
as a means of raising revenue, but rather as a means of constituent 
speech, the preferences of constituents who are not traditional taxpayers 
should be valued on equal footing.207  Professor Staudt makes this point 
in regard to a familiar federal tax option: the voluntary election to 
contribute to federal campaign financing.208  She notes that the election 
serves as a mechanism of political expression but is nonetheless afforded 
only to taxpayers.209  Because the election is equivalent to the right to 
vote on how to spend federal revenue, she argues that it should be 
extended to all individuals regardless of taxpayer or non-taxpayer 
status.210  By analogy, the same holds true for the opt-out system. 
Of course, one might argue that governments should not ask low 
income constituents for money.  But in an opt-out system, basic 
concerns of distributive justice are vitiated.211  The inclusion of low-
 
206. See Clark, supra note 52, at 437 (“No one can or should have more input than 
anyone else.”). 
207. See Staudt, supra note 11, at 556–57 (arguing that special rights afforded to 
taxpayers at the federal level are equivalent to voting rights and should be afforded to all 
individuals, not just taxpayers).  In fact, it is unconstitutional to tie voting rights to tax 
payments.  See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).  The Court, in finding 
Virginia’s poll tax unconstitutional, wrote, 
 
[W]e must remember that the interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is 
limited to the power to fix qualifications.  Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not 
germane to one’s ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.  Lines 
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally 
disfavored. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
208. Staudt, supra note 11, at 565–66; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 388 (noting 
that where only taxpayers are permitted to vote, “[s]uffrage is restricted”).  For a general 
description of the federal election campaign check-off, see Levmore, supra, at 388–91. 
209. Staudt, supra note 11, at 566.   
210. Id. at 556–57. 
211. A tax is regressive when lower income taxpayers share a greater percentage of the 
burden than high-income taxpayers.  Flat fees are regressive because they comprise a greater 
proportion of the income or wealth of taxpayers at the lower end of the economic spectrum.  
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income constituents cannot result in an undue financial burden because 
they can opt out of payment.  Furthermore, failure to give non-
taxpayers the option to participate could be interpreted as both 
patronizing and paternalistic: patronizing because the representative 
government seems not to value non-taxpayer input on the non-essential 
spending proposal, and paternalistic because it suggests that government 
cannot trust these constituents to make decisions in their own best 
interest. 
Although there are dangers to automatic inclusion, it is preferable to 
exclusion.  Assume, for instance, that Constituent A is a low-income 
retiree who is a resident of Locality B.  Locality B has designated free 
tai chi lessons as an opt-out item.  Although Constituent A is not a 
taxpayer, she favors free lessons and would like to contribute to their 
establishment.  If she, and others in her position, are not included in the 
opt-out system, her only means of expressing a preference is by making 
an unsolicited, voluntary contribution.  This, however, is unlikely to 
happen.  First, Constituent A may not learn of the opt-out item if she is 
not enrolled in the system.  As a result of her lack of knowledge, she will 
be barred from expressing a preference even if she could do so legally.  
Second, even if Constituent A learns of the opt-out item and intends to 
contribute, she must also know of the mechanism for making a 
voluntary contribution, if one exists.  Given the often opaque nature of 
local government, contributing may be difficult at best, and only the 
most persistent non-taxpayers will express a preference.  Third, 
establishing a parallel system to process voluntary contributions is likely 
to be an inefficient use of local government resources.  As a result, it is 
preferable to include all constituents in the opt-out system. 
Some may argue that the initial inclusion of all constituents could 
result in a regressive outcome if constituents at very low levels of 
income remain enrolled for reasons other than preference.212  For 
instance, handicapped or illiterate constituents may face barriers when 
 
See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 358–59 (5th ed. 1989). 
212. For a corollary, consider consumer protection laws that shield individuals from 
transactions where they are simply unable to protect their own interests.  See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1345.03(B)(1) (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that “knowingly [taking] advantage of 
the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect the consumer’s interests because of the 
consumer’s physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy, or inability to understand the 
language of an agreement” is an unconscionable consumer trade practice). 
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interacting with government.213  If the process of opting out is too 
onerous, these constituents, who are more likely to have less wealth, will 
contribute to non-essential government spending in contravention to 
their preferences when constituents who are not similarly disadvantaged 
will not be forced to do so.214 
I find this argument unpersuasive for three reasons.  First, it is 
patronizing to assume that entire groups of people will be overwhelmed 
by interaction with the government.  It is far more likely that particular 
individuals will encounter difficulty rather than entire groups.  As a 
result, individual solutions are preferable to group exclusion.  Second, to 
the extent that entire groups do encounter difficulty, simple procedural 
solutions exist.  For instance, if we assume that most constituents over 
the age of ninety will encounter difficulty because they are less mobile 
or internet facile, a locality could provide them with targeted assistance, 
such as large-print, postage-paid mailers.215  Finally, exclusion of some 
groups on the basis of their assumed lack of functionality may result in 
disingenuous disregard for the preferences of constituents in those 
groups.  Furthermore, exclusion of these constituents, even if 
benevolently motivated, may be perceived by them as malicious, 
resulting in additional pressure on the constituent–representative 
relationship.  Inclusion of all constituents is, therefore, preferable. 
4. Form of the Charge 
Having concluded that the greatest possible number of participants 
should be included in an opt-out system, it becomes necessary to 
determine what form the opt-out charge should take.  Because it 
addresses the transfer of funds from constituents to the local 
government, this consideration is analogous to the determination of an 
appropriate tax base.216  Like the decision of which expenses to include 
in the opt-out system, this choice will depend, to some extent, on the 
individual circumstances and laws applicable to a particular locality.217 
 
213. See id. 
214. See id. 
215. For additional discussion on disenfranchisement of the elderly, see Kingshuk K. 
Roy, Sleeping Watchdogs of Personal Liberty: State Laws Disenfranchising the Elderly, 11 
ELDER L.J. 109 (2003). 
216. For a discussion of tax base, see MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 211, at 328–
30. 
217. For instance, many state constitutions prevent cities within those states from 
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As a preliminary matter, it is possible to dismiss levies against 
property as an inappropriate form of the opt-out charge in most 
localities.  First, if property ownership were employed as a basis for 
calculating the charge, all non-owners would be excluded from the 
system, which is objectionable on disenfranchisement grounds.218  
Second, levies as a percentage of sales may be dismissed on grounds of 
administrative infeasibility.  The opt-out charge would be identified with 
particular individuals, and it is not currently practical for localities to 
track sales taxes paid by particular individuals.219  Furthermore, even if 
tracking individual sales became administratively feasible in the future, 
the use of a levy against sales would make the amount of the opt-out 
charge dependent upon the individual payor’s purchases.  As a result, 
the amount of the payment would depend on a factor unrelated to 
constituent preference.  Neither would it correlate to the amount of the 
non-essential expense forwarded for approval by the representative 
government. 
Attaching the opt-out charge to an income tax would be a better 
option administratively, if not substantively.  For instance, the German 
system levies a charge at the rate of 8% or 9% of an individual’s federal 
income tax liability.220  Pegging the opt-out charge to federal income tax 
liability accomplishes two goals in Germany.  First, it creates economies 
of scale in collection.221  Because the church tax is automatically withheld 
from a taxpayer’s wages in many cases, religious organizations are able 
to piggyback on the state’s existing collection mechanisms.222  This 
 
levying an income tax.  In such cases, calculation of the opt-out charge could not be tied to 
income. 
218. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668–70 (1966) (holding that tying 
votes to wealth violates the federal Equal Protection Clause).  
219. Of course, technological development will change the face of tax information 
reporting in the future.  See Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax 
Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 348 (2010) (“[A]ccurate and timely tax 
information should be delivered electronically, supplanting our anachronistic delivery system 
of paper tax information statements.”). 
220. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 604. This rate is determined by a conference of the 
taxing organizations.  SächsKiStG, supra note 102, § 10(2).  If the organizations cannot agree 
to a rate, the state finance administration must determine a rate.  Id.; Robbers, State and 
Church, supra note 103, at 69. 
221. The state retains an administrative fee of 4% to 5% of the amount collected, which 
is far less than it would cost the organizations to conduct collections themselves.  See 
Robbers, Minority Churches, supra note 105, at 164. 
222. See Bay KirStG, supra note 102, § 17(1) (stating levies must be administered by the 
religious organization, which may request the State Ministry of Finance to assume the 
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significantly lowers administrative costs of the tax.  Second, by 
calculating the church tax as a percentage of federal tax liability, the 
German system incorporates federal adjustments to tax.223  Assuming 
that these adjustments promote important public objectives, duplicating 
them through adoption of tax liability as the opt-out base would further 
those objectives.224 
There is a glaring problem with using income as a measure of opt-
out liability.  As discussed above, doing so will disenfranchise low-
income constituents who pay no tax.  Furthermore, pegging an opt-out 
charge to the income tax is not possible for local governments that do 
not levy such a tax.225  Doing so is also unlikely to generate an amount of 
revenue that corresponds in any way to the anticipated non-essential 
government expense.  Finally, an income tax base would devalue the 
contribution of those who earn little income and would completely 
disenfranchise those who pay no tax.226 
Although the appropriate choice of contribution base will vary 
according to the circumstances and laws of a given locality, we have 
arrived by process of elimination at a flat charge per constituent.  
Importantly, a flat charge is inclusive of all constituents, and it affords 
each constituent equal weight in political speech.  A flat charge may also 
be tied directly to the anticipated amount of the non-essential expense.  
For instance, if each movie in the park will cost $200, and 
representatives determine that the project should move forward if at 
least twenty constituents support it, the flat opt-out charge should be 
$10.  This kind of calculation would be nearly impossible with an 
income, sales, or property-based charge. 
As usual, a flat charge is not without problems.  Because a flat 
charge could not be withheld from wages in the way that an income-
based charge could be, it may be more expensive to administer.  Second, 
 
collection function); see also Robbers, State and Church, supra note 103, at 69.   
223. See Hoffer, supra note 8, at 604–05. 
224. I do not assert that a particular set of concerns exists in both systems, but practically 
speaking, since both systems involve public finance, it is probably the case.  For instance, the 
concern of a family’s ability to pay versus a single person’s ability to pay may arise in both 
cases.  
225. Not all cities levy a local income tax.  See HENRY J. RAIMONDO, ECONOMICS OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 171, 186 (1992) (stating that income tax in most states is 
imposed by state government and local income tax levies are usually made by large counties 
or cities). 
226. In effect, this would set up a pay-to-play system. 
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a flat charge is subject to attack on the distributive justice front.  If each 
participating constituent pays $10 to fund movies in the park, the charge 
will be a lesser percentage of a wealthy person’s resources than of a 
poorer person’s resources, making it regressive.  In a mandatory funding 
structure, this discrepancy would be troubling.  I argue, however, 
regressivity is mitigated by constituents’ ability to opt out of some or all 
of the charge.  Consequently, I conclude that although it is not perfect, a 
flat charge is the best contribution base for use in an opt-out system. 
V.  BENEFITS OF ADOPTING AN OPT-OUT SYSTEM 
Having outlined my proposal for the use of an opt-out system to 
finance certain non-essential local government expenses, I now address 
why constituents’ expression of preference for the scope of 
representatives’ spending authority should be tied to constituents’ 
contributions toward certain items of non-essential spending.  In other 
words, why not ask constituents to simply vote yes or no on any given 
issue of spending?  Although doing so may be appropriate in some 
circumstances, the opt-out model offers benefits not available through a 
simple vote.  In addition to addressing strong critiques of direct 
democracy—that direct democracy encourages tyranny of the majority 
and allows residents to export their tax burden to other localities—tying 
preference expression to actual dollars fosters democratic debate even 
where most constituents do not speak in the traditional sense. 
In addition to creating a de facto debate, using an opt-out system as 
a complement to existing forms of direct democracy could result in a 
number of other benefits.  First, it satisfies constituents’ normative 
intuitions about the libertarian nature of local government227 while 
sheltering the ability of representative government to provide essential 
goods and services.  In addition, it confers legitimacy on the items of 
spending that would be most subject to question by constituents.228  
Together, these benefits should quell the tendency of constituents to 
overreach through use of other direct democratic processes such as the 
 
227. See Stark, supra note 9, at 194; see also Levmore, supra note 11, at 406 (arguing that 
tax voting allows constituents to voice an opinion on government’s choice of cause-based 
spending).   
228. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 11, at 406 (explaining that constituents may tolerate a 
greater level of redistributive spending if they can help government choose the beneficiaries 
of that spending). 
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ballot initiative.229  Second, use of an opt-out system would place local 
governments on equal footing with charitable organizations in areas 
where the functions of these two groups most strongly overlap.230  Under 
favorable conditions, governmental restraint in use of the taxing power 
to fund certain non-essential spending might result in an efficient 
allocation of resources between these two groups.  Third, an opt-out 
system has the potential to encourage deliberation among constituents 
by providing a steady stream of information about the preferences of 
other constituents and representative government over time.  It also 
would provide a mild form of non-geographical Tiebout sorting,231 
allowing constituents to either provide or avoid supporting the provision 
of public goods without relocating to another locality.  Finally, 
widespread use of an opt-out system has the potential to change 
constituents’ assumptions about one another.  Namely, successful 
funding of non-essential goods solely through the consent of 
constituents would go some distance toward dispelling the traditional 
anti-tax American stereotype that currently dominates popular culture 
and academic literature.232  Perhaps it is simply not the case that 
Americans are not civically minded.  Contradiction of the unsupported 
stereotype by actual facts has the potential to change the tenor of 
political debate and constituent decision-making at the state and local 
levels. 
A.  Creating a Non-Verbal Dialogue 
An important benefit of the opt-out system is the creation of a non-
verbal democratic dialogue among constituents.  Direct democracy is 
often criticized on the grounds that constituents must vote without the 
benefit of deliberation that would have resulted from the representative 
 
229. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Legitimacy and the Right of Revolution: The Role of 
Tax Protests and Anti-Tax Rhetoric in America, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 819, 879 (2002) (stating that 
alienation and distrust of government lead to increased resort to direct democracy). 
230. Cf. Galle, supra note 163, at 36 (“[T]he argument that charity fills in where 
government cannot has been oversold.”); David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable 
Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 TAX L. 
REV. 221, 262 (2009) (explaining that government budgets are large and ranges of public 
goals are vast, and therefore, government cannot provide the same focus on fit and quality). 
231. For a brief discussion of Tiebout sorting, see infra Part V.D. 
232. For a discussion of the prevailing stereotype of Americans being opposed to 
taxation, see infra Part V.F. 
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democratic process.233  In addition, constituents must vote without the 
benefit of fully knowing the preferences of their fellows.234 
Using an opt-out system to finance certain non-essential expenses 
addresses these concerns somewhat.  In a system that automatically 
registers the response or non-response of every constituent, all 
constituents must express some preference, either de facto or otherwise.  
Unlike a traditional voting process, it is not possible to remain silent in 
an opt-out system.  This is because a dollar amount is attached to either 
opting out or remaining enrolled in the system.  In an ordinary direct 
democratic vote, a constituent may remain silent by simply avoiding the 
polls.  In contrast, an opt-out system requires each constituent to pay or 
not.235  In other words, dedication or removal of funds from the cause is 
tantamount to political speech or, to put the matter more crassly, money 
talks. 
Of course, a choice to opt out or remain enrolled in the system is not 
perfectly expressive, and either choice could mean a number of things.  
Lack of perfect expressiveness is not, however, a cause for concern.  
First, although the information provided by the opt-out system is not 
rich in detail, the system creates a strong form of constituent expression 
that is clearly and unquestionably cognizable to representatives.  Unlike 
verbal or written speech, which may or may not be heard, payment or 
non-payment of money directly affects the course of action available to 
representatives.  This conveys information about the constituents’ 
implicit delegation of non-essential spending authority to 
representatives, even if the reason for the scope of that delegation is 
opaque.  Consider a constituent’s choice to opt out.  Perhaps the 
constituent favors an item of non-essential spending but simply cannot 
afford to contribute to it, or alternatively, the constituent objects to the 
project itself, whether or not it is affordable to the constituent.  The 
objection could be substantive (the constituent does not like movies in 
the park), or it could be political (the constituent does not think that the 
government’s role includes movies in the park).  These three meanings 
are vastly different, but all of them lead us to conclude that the 
 
233. Robinson, supra note 25, at 546 (noting that deliberation in legislative enactment is 
the reason for “reliability of and judicial respect for” the representative democratic process). 
234. Levmore, supra note 11, at 394–95. 
235. Indeed, Professor Staudt makes a similar point with regard to taxpayers’ federal 
Form 1040 check-the-box election to dedicate funds toward election campaign contributions.  
See Staudt, supra note 11, at 565–66.  
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constituent objects to the non-essential spending at issue and that he 
does not authorize the representative government to use his dollars to 
engage in it.236 
Likewise, a constituent’s continued enrollment in the system could 
have disparate meanings.  Among other things, continued enrollment 
could mean that a constituent approves the proposed spending, neither 
approves nor opposes the proposed spending, opposes the proposed 
spending but remains enrolled out of a sense of moral obligation, or 
opposes the proposed spending but is either unaware of or unable to 
exercise the opt out.237 
In the second instance, where a constituent neither approves nor 
opposes the proposed spending, the constituent cannot be said to care 
about the scope of the representative government’s authority with 
regard to the spending.  In essence, the constituent remains enrolled in 
the opt-out system as a result of the stickiness of the default option.  
Although this inertia does not truly express a preference on the 
particular item of spending in question, it is expressive in another way.  
By failing to opt out, constituents who neither approve nor oppose non-
essential spending express the view that the debate is unimportant.  If 
that is true, and if a constituent contributes funds despite her apathy, the 
opt-out system should make a presumption in favor of granting 
discretionary spending authority to the representative government, 
which has presumably arrived at the item through a process of debate 
and compromise. 
In the third instance, where a constituent opposes a particular non-
essential expense but feels morally obligated to contribute, the response 
should be treated, once again, as a grant of discretionary spending 
authority to the representative government.  In fact, this situation is not 
so different from the imposition of actual taxes.  Where a constituent 
remains enrolled in the system with little interest in the actual project at 
hand, he has made a decision to contribute to the general welfare of the 
community through the creation of public goods regardless of whether 
he will use them.  As a result, we should not be troubled by the fact that 
the constituent’s response does not reflect his own preference about a 
 
236. If the constituent objects to non-essential spending on grounds that he cannot 
afford it, he may, of course, be willing to authorize the representative government to spend 
other people’s dollars on the project.   
237. As mentioned earlier, instances in which a constituent would prefer to opt out, but 
is somehow prevented from doing so, can be minimized through procedural protections.  
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particular project.  His continued participation indicates his preference 
about the scope of the representative government’s authority.238 
In a transparent opt-out system, where constituents are able to see 
the responses of others (although not necessarily match those responses 
with the identities of others), a series of non-verbal communications 
automatically arises on the topic of the proposed expenditure.  Unlike a 
traditional direct democratic vote, every constituent is a participant, and 
if the system allows a rolling opt-out, each constituent can express his or 
her preference while armed with sufficient knowledge of the choices of 
others.  Furthermore, because funds are attached to the choice to opt 
out or remain enrolled, each constituent’s expression of preference has a 
direct impact on the success of the collective endeavor and directly 
affects the course of action taken by the representative government. 
B.  Averting the Tax Revolt 
Providing even a minor outlet for some pressure inherent in the 
constituent–representative government relationship has the potential to 
produce more reasoned constituent voting on levy requests and may 
even avert further tax revolt.  Although some may view “[t]he tax 
revolt” primarily as a problem of the 1970s,239 there is no reason to 
conclude that direct democratic incursion into state and local spending 
decisions is no longer a threat.240  Constituents have the ability to block 
needed rate increases.  In addition, nothing prevents constituents and 
interest groups from using the initiative and referendum processes to 
impose new limitations on representative governments.241  As a result, it 
 
238. In fact, it could be argued that such a response is, in fact, a stronger grant of 
authority than one from a constituent who favors the project. 
239. See David Lowery, The Attitudinal Consequences of the Tax Revolt, 4 POL. BEHAV. 
333, 333 (1982) (referring to “[t]he tax revolt” as a single event that “swept across the United 
States” after the passage of California’s Proposition 13). 
240. See Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 929 (noting that as a country, the United States 
must “maintain the delicate balance between healthy and self-destructive tax protest 
[because t]he current debate has shown no such balance or moderation”).  In fact, Lowery’s 
empirical study concluded that voters remained as dissatisfied after the tax revolt as they had 
been before it.  See Lowery, supra note 239, at 342. 
241. In fact, a number of tax and spending limitations appeared on the ballot in fall 2010.  
See, e.g., Tim Hoover, The Colorado Vote Amendments 60, 61; Proposition 101 “Ugly Three” 
Appear Headed for a Big Loss, DENVER POST, Nov. 3, 2010, at B1 (discussing the voters’ 
rejection of Amendment 61, which would have “prohibited the state from any kind of 
borrowing and limited local governments to borrowing only for ten years”); Ballot Questions 
Ready for June, MORNING SENTINEL (Waterville, Me.) (Apr. 15, 2010), http:// 
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is in the best interest of representative governments to understand the 
phenomenon of tax revolt and to find means to address it.  Using an opt-
out system to provide constituents with some level of input on 
discretionary spending decisions may be one such means. 
To know whether this is true, or even desirable, we must first 
understand potential causes of tax revolt.  Scholars have posited a 
number of causes, none of which are mutually exclusive, and four 
general categories have emerged.242  First, it is possible that some 
constituents favor direct democratic limitation of tax and spending 
because they perceive state and local government as unnecessarily large 
in scope.243  Research has shown this to be a strong influence in tax 
revolts.244  Indeed, one relevant study has shown that beliefs about the 
appropriate size of government play a strong role in tax revolt.245  In 
such instances, a vote in favor of revolt is an attempt to limit that size.246  
Second, some constituents may favor tax revolt because they perceive 
the state or local government as wasteful.247  In these cases, a vote for 
limiting the government’s tax or spending power is not necessarily an 
attempt to limit the size of government; rather, it is an attempt to force 
greater government efficiency.248  Third, some constituents may favor 
direct democratic limitations of tax and spending simply because they 
are worried about their “personal finances” or “the economy in 
general.”249  Finally, some constituents may be disenchanted with state 
 
www.onlinesentinel.com/news/ballot-questions-ready-for-june_2010-04-14.html (discussing 
Maine’s then-upcoming vote on Question 1: “Do you want to reject the new law that lowers 
Maine’s income tax and replaces that revenue by making changes to the sales tax?”); Colin 
Sullivan, Calif’s Little-Noticed Prop 26 Squeaks Through in Dead of Night, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/11/03/03greenwire-califs-little-noticed-prop-26-
squeaks-through-59912.html (discussing California voters’ adoption of Proposition 26, which 
changed the definition of environmental fees). 
242. See Lowery, supra note 239, at 334–36 (aggregating and categorizing numerous 
academic theories on the cause of tax revolt). 
243. Id. at 334. 
244. Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 912 (stating that research showed “‘the central issue 
in the tax revolt was how much government should be doing, not so much whether it was 
doing it well or badly’” (emphasis omitted) (quoting DAVID O. SEARS & JACK CITRIN, TAX 
REVOLT 187 (1982))). 
245. Id. (describing an empirical study on the causes of tax revolt). 
246. See Lowery, supra note 239, at 334 (theorizing tax revolt was aimed at trimming “a 
bloated government”). 
247. Id. at 335. 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
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and local government overall.250  These voters are not necessarily 
concerned with the specifics of government’s scope or efficiency.251  
Instead, they are voicing non-specific dissatisfaction through a readily 
available channel.252 
Constituents who are prone to vote in favor of tax and spending 
limitations as a result of the categories above could voice similar 
positions through an opt-out system.  Admittedly, the practical effect of 
acting through the opt-out system may be of a lesser magnitude.  
Refusing to contribute to movies in the park, for instance, is much 
different from acting in concert with others to enact a strict property tax 
limitation.  Nonetheless, it is not clear that all constituents require a 
strict property tax limitation in order to achieve psychic satisfaction 
from their actions.  For instance, empirical studies of Costa Rican 
politics have shown that constituents dissatisfied with national 
government seek participation at the local level before turning to 
protest.253  This indicates that if given the choice between a less drastic 
and a more drastic political act, constituents may choose the less drastic 
option.  This is particularly true in light of the time and resources 
required to initiate most direct democratic processes.254  An opt-out 
system would provide one means of less drastic action, functioning as a 
form of pressure valve. 
C.  Improved Allocation of Resources 
An additional benefit of using an opt-out system for the provision of 
certain non-essential public goods lies in its potential to create a more 
reasoned allocation of resources between local governments and 
charitable organizations.  The appropriate acquisition and allocation of 
privately held property for use in the provision of public goods is a topic 
that has received extensive consideration in academic literature.255  To 
date, most scholars have assumed that government is an insufficient 
provider of public goods and that its function must be supplemented by 
 
250. Id. at 336. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. 
253. See John A. Booth & Mitchell A. Seligson, Political Legitimacy and Participation in 
Costa Rica: Evidence of Arena Shopping, 58 POL. RES. Q. 537, 547 (2005). 
254. See supra text accompanying note 69 (citing expense as a factor in ballot initiatives). 
255. See Galle, supra note 163, at 2; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 416–20 (1956); Weisbrod, supra note 191, at 185. 
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charitable or private providers.256  Myriad theories exist to support 
nearly innumerable variations of a normatively desirable allocation 
scheme,257 but few of them have focused on the interplay between 
charitable organizations and local governments.258  Rather, the debate 
has focused on the propriety of federal tax subsidization of charitable 
organizations or private providers of public goods.259 
Despite the assertions of many scholars that government is a 
suboptimal provider of public goods, it is far from certain that charitable 
organizations or other private providers are categorically superior.260  In 
other words, there is no clear reason to favor allocation to charitable 
organizations over government in every instance.  However, the 
converse is also true; it is not clear that government is a superior 
provider of public goods.261  As Professor Galle has written, both 
governments and charitable organizations may have substantial 
advantages but also may be subject to substantial flaws.262  For instance, 
in most cases the government possesses significant advantages of scale 
and scope263 and is able to provide a wide variety of public goods and 
services.264  In addition, decisions made by the government are the result 
of deliberation and compromise, whereas decisions made by charitable 
organizations may result from the interests of a very small group of 
 
256. See Galle, supra note 163, at 2 (noting that prevailing theory for justification of tax 
subsidization of charitable organizations is market failure); Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, 
The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017, 2022–23 (2007) (arguing for 
subsidization of for-profit firms engaged in the provision of public goods).   
257. See Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of 
Distributive Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505, 518–28 (2010) (cataloging theories that justify 
the exemption of charitable organizations’ income from taxation). 
258. See Galle, supra note 163, at 13. 
259. See Fleischer, supra note 257, at 518–28; Malani & Posner, supra note 256, at 2020–
21 (summarizing subsidy theories and suggesting that none justify coupling tax benefits with 
not-for-profit status). 
260. See Galle, supra note 163, at 5 (stating that it is possible “that many of 
government’s putative flaws are equally true of charity”). 
261. See id. 
262. See id. at 36–49 (arguing that multiple factors affect the relevant balance between 
provision of public goods by charitable organizations or by the government and that no single 
factor is dispositive). 
263. For example, the government may effectively integrate education with children’s 
public health, but doing so would be far more difficult for a charitable organization.  See id. at 
72 (government has advantages of scale and scope). 
264. See id. at 4. 
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people.265  Furthermore, elected officials may be scrutinized more 
heavily by the public than managers of charitable organizations, 
resulting in actions more consonant with constituents’ expectations.266  
Finally, in some locations, competition among local governments may 
result in a more efficient provision of goods and services, or, in 
combination with Tiebout sorting, a more constituent-appropriate mix.267 
Charities, however, are not without strengths, and governments are 
not without weaknesses.  As a result, there are some instances in which 
charitable organizations may be better providers of public goods and 
services than the government.268  For example, charitable organizations 
may have better access to information than the government.269  In 
addition, they may be better situated to recruit talented employees and 
volunteers.270  Furthermore, because they are not beholden to the 
median voter, lobbyists, or strong political backers, charitable 
organizations may increase diversity of public goods and be more 
responsive to minority preferences for more or different goods.271  
Finally, donors to charitable organizations may receive the benefit of a 
“warm glow,” or personal satisfaction from donating that may not arise 
from the duty to pay taxes.272 
Whether one or more of the characteristics described above inures 
to any particular local government or charitable organization is a pure 
question of fact.  As such, the answer must necessarily vary among 
organizations along a number of variables, including constituent 
demography, geographic scope, and the ability of constituents to exert 
influence over either local governments or charitable organizations.  As 
a consequence, any blanket determination of the appropriate allocation 
of resources among local governments and charitable organizations 
must rely on a set of generalized assumptions that will hold true for no 
locality whatsoever.  Although useful for generating a set of 
 
265. See id. at 41 (noting that the nonprofit sector lacks a cross-organizational 
mechanism for “debating conflicts and coordinating priorities”). 
266. See id. at 46. 
267. For a brief description of Tiebout’s theory, see infra Part V.D.  
268. See Galle, supra note 163, at 4–5 (noting that commentators have cited ability to 
attract talent and gather information as relative strengths of charities versus government). 
269. See id. 
270. See id. 
271. Id. at 10–11. 
272. See Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501, 526–
27 (1990).  
09-HOFFER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012  2:27 PM 
628 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:563 
 
considerations to be used at the local level, broader academic theories of 
allocation, and their necessary assumptions, break down when viewed in 
light of individual circumstances faced by constituents in any given time 
or place.  In other words, scholars simply do not have sufficient 
information to describe an ideal allocation in light of the United States’ 
federal structure.  The desirability of any given allocation will depend 
heavily on factors, the weight and presence of which may be judged only 
by those close to the entities in question. 
In this regard, an opt-out system of funding certain non-essential 
goods would delegate a portion of the decision-making process about 
allocation among local governments and charitable organizations to 
constituents.  Rather than invoke its mandatory taxing power to fund a 
specific public good or service, local government would leave the 
allocation decision to constituents.  These constituents could choose to 
fund the good or service through the government or to divert their 
resources elsewhere, either to provide the same or different public 
goods through charitable organizations, or to private consumption or 
saving.  In any of these cases, the representative government would 
receive valuable input about constituents’ views on government 
provision of the service. 
Again, it is worth noting that constituent input would be non-specific 
(i.e., the representative government would not learn the specific reasons 
why constituents do or do not favor government provision of the good).  
But the actual channeling of dollars by constituents either to charitable 
organizations or to private consumption or saving would nonetheless 
speak to the breadth of the representative government’s role in areas 
where it overlaps with that of charitable organizations.  This construct 
has the benefit of allowing constituents to individually consider factors 
important to them, including those set forth in academic literature on 
the allocation of funds between governments and charitable 
organizations.  Because constituents are more likely to have adequate 
information about factors affecting ideal allocation between the two 
types of institutions at the local level, their participation may result in a 
more normatively desirable allocation than a formulaic or generalized 
academic approach. 
Facilitating constituent choice has additional benefits.  For instance, 
it would level the playing field between governmental and charitable 
providers of public goods in areas where they overlap.  Whereas, the 
government may invoke its mandatory taxing power, and therefore has 
a competitive advantage in the marketplace of funding, charitable 
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organizations may not do so.  This disparity is problematic because it 
may allow local government to force government provision of an 
inferior version of the good when charitable organizations may be better 
positioned to provide a superior version.  Allowing constituents to select 
a favored provider through an opt-out system would provide equal 
opportunity for competition between charitable organizations and the 
government.  In other words, equal competition between local 
government and charitable organizations is desirable as an alternative to 
“crowd out,” where the provision of low quality goods by the 
government may discourage some donors from contributing to 
charitable organizations that would provide a higher-quality version of 
the same goods.273  In addition, preserving the option of government 
provision allows constituents to take advantage of the government’s 
ability to provide economies of scale and scope if they exist in a 
particular locality.274  Furthermore, allowing constituents to voluntarily 
participate in funding a particular good through the government would 
extend the phenomena of warm glow or pure altruism beyond the 
borders of charitable contribution and would minimize the mental costs 
of compulsory taxation, allowing more constituents to enjoy psychic 
benefits not readily available in the absence of an opt out.275 
To summarize, I do not suggest that an opt-out system could or 
should take the place of charitable giving, or that charity should 
supplant government provision of public goods.  Rather, I emphasize 
the point raised both here and in Professor Galle’s work that larger 
theories regarding the optimal provision of public goods often fail to 
account for variations in the capability of local government and the 
needs of the local populace.276  Although it is not a complete cure, the 
 
273. See Galle, supra note 163, at 55, 67–68 (describing crowd-out and observing that if a 
constituent in this circumstance makes the unlikely decision to both pay tax and donate to a 
charitable organization that provides the same good, she has effectively paid twice). 
274. Id. at 3, 67–68, 72 (government has massive advantages of scale and fundraising). 
275. Id. at 67 (offering warm glow as a partial justification for federal subsidization of 
charitable organizations); Schizer, supra note 230, at 225–26, 230 (arguing that facilitation of 
voluntary contributions may increase altruism and “warm glow,” as well as minimize the 
welfare costs associated with compulsory taxation). 
276. Professor Galle has argued that subsidization of charitable organizations is 
necessary or desirable where a charitable organization’s mission is multi-jurisdictional.  Galle, 
supra note 163, at 5–6, 86–87.  Subsidization may also be desirable when the local government 
is of limited effectiveness resulting from reduced competition as a result of constituents’ high 
moving costs or lack of information about rival jurisdictions, or from excess inter-
jurisdictional competition that prevents local governments from providing public goods.  Id. 
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opt-out system goes some distance toward addressing this concern.  It 
moves toward recognition that where local governments and charitable 
organizations assume overlapping functions, equal competition for funds 
could produce a result that more closely aligns with constituent 
knowledge and preferences. 
D.  Creating Non-Geographical Tiebout Sorting 
Another benefit of the opt-out system is its potential to create a 
limited form of non-geographical Tiebout sorting.  In A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, economist Charles Tiebout famously wrote that 
local voters are like consumers who shop for communities that best suit 
their preferences.277  According to the theory, “[m]oving or failing to 
move replaces the usual market test of willingness to buy a good and 
reveals the consumer-voter’s demand for public goods.”278  As a result, 
the provision of public goods by local governments should reflect the 
preferences of constituents.279  If this were the case, there would be no 
need for an opt-out system or any other gauge of voter preference.  
Tiebout, however, relied on a set of highly improbably assumptions, 
including assumptions that constituents are fully mobile, have full 
knowledge about their choices, and have a large number of 
heterogeneous communities from which to choose.280  These premises 
are highly unrealistic, and as Tiebout himself recognized, “[c]onsumer-
voters do not have perfect knowledge and set preferences, nor are they 
perfectly mobile.”281 
Subsequent empirical studies have confirmed that Tiebout’s analogy 
and assumptions do not hold in real life.282  For instance, research has 
shown that the presence of multiple jurisdictions is not sufficient to 
ensure competition among them.283  Furthermore, individuals within 
 
at 4–6.  I do not seek to challenge this argument; rather, I note that constituents themselves 
are in the best position to determine whether these conditions exist. 
277. Tiebout, supra note 255, at 418 (1956).   
278. Id. at 420. 
279. Id. at 416. 
280. Id. at 419.  One critic has called the assumptions “so patently unrealistic as to verge 
on outrageous.”  See Wallace E. Oates, On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. 
ECON. REV. 93, 93 (1981). 
281. See Tiebout, supra note 255, at 423. 
282. See Oates, supra note 280, at 94–95 (cataloging empirical work tending to disprove 
Tiebout’s assumptions). 
283. Id. at 94. 
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jurisdictions show too much variation in preferences for local services to 
support Tiebout’s position.284  In addition, there seems to be very little 
correlation between the amounts paid by taxpayers and goods and 
services actually received by them, which suggests that consumers’ 
shopping behavior is not fully analogous to constituents choosing a 
locality in which to live.285  Indeed, commentators have suggested that 
constituents may, instead, be choosing or rejecting one another rather 
than the package of goods and services offered by the representative 
government.286 
None of this is to say that Tiebout was full of bunk.  Clearly, some 
people move from one community to another as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the level of public goods provided or the level of 
taxes charged by the representative government.  But it is equally clear 
that constituent migration cannot be viewed as an accurate gauge of 
constituents’ aggregate preferences.  Nonetheless, it may be possible to 
allow constituents to behave like consumers through a mechanism other 
than full geographic relocation.  Local governments’ adoption of an opt-
out system could compensate, in some small regard, for constituents’ 
lack of mobility, choice, and cross-jurisdictional knowledge.  
Constituents presented with an opportunity to either participate or not 
while remaining within their current geographic location need not worry 
about mobility issues such as continued access to employment and their 
preferred peer group.  In addition, they need not be concerned with the 
fact that their cross-jurisdictional choices may be constrained by 
uniformity across local governments.  In fact, because constituents’ 
choices are entirely personal and intra-jurisdictional, they do not need 
information about outside jurisdictions to effectively express a 
preference.  In this way, an opt-out system enables constituents to voice 
a preference, as envisioned by Tiebout, but without actually relocating. 
 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 94–95. 
286. See id. at 95 (arguing that individuals who comprise a community are just as 
important to community outcomes as capital input); Lee Anne Fennell, Beyond Exit and 
Voice: User Participation in the Production of Local Public Goods, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28–29 
(2001) (stating that where the quality of locally provided goods, such as public safety and 
education, relies upon user input, constituents seek out pools of users whose input will 
improve the provision of those goods). 
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E.  Increased Civic Participation Through Quiet Deliberation 
Yet another possible benefit of the opt-out system is its potential to 
increase civic participation and to engender a quiet deliberation among 
constituents about the role of representative government in the 
provision of non-essential public goods.  A rich literature on 
deliberative democracy suggests that, if given politically neutral 
information and time to discuss it, constituents are willing to consider 
that information, including the viewpoints of others, which may lead 
them to reconsider their entrenched views.287  The opt-out system may 
provide a form of deliberation in which constituents are provided with 
information on the views of others, as well as information about the 
representative government’s proposed spending.  Although the 
discursive format is not as strong as, say, a New England town meeting, 
the opt-out system’s provision of information coupled with time for 
consideration would allow constituents to make fully informed choices.  
Because these choices would not be one-and-done votes, they would 
contribute to a running non-verbal exchange on the subject with 
potential for creating verbal exchange as well.  The result could be a 
more thoughtful outcome than would be produced by a simple one-off 
vote on a particular spending issue.  Furthermore, this novel form of 
involvement may increase civic participation in other areas. 
Research on increased direct democratic involvement has gained 
ground in political science over the last decade.288  Scholars have noted 
the potential for participatory models of government to strengthen 
relationships between constituents and representative government, to 
“build public trust in the government,” and to give the representative 
government access to new sources of information and ideas.289  And 
these suggested benefits are not merely speculative; recent empirical 
studies provide evidence of their existence.290  For instance, research has 
 
287. For articles elucidating this point, see Hiro N. Aragaki, Deliberative Democracy as 
Dispute Resolution? Conflict, Interests, and Reasons, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 407 
(2009); and Lawrence Susskind, Deliberative Democracy and Dispute Resolution, 24 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 395 (2009).  See generally Ethan J. Leib, Towards a Practice of 
Deliberative Democracy: A Proposal for a Popular Branch, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 359 (2002). 
288. For articles elucidating this point, see generally Caroline J. Tolbert et al., 
Enhancing Civic Engagement: The Effect of Direct Democracy on Political Participation and 
Knowledge, 3 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 23, 24 (2003) (cataloging arguments regarding direct 
democracy’s effect on civic involvement). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 24–27 (providing an overview of several empirical studies on the subject).  
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confirmed that the use of direct democracy by states increases their 
voter turnout, even in unpopular midterm elections.291  Research also 
confirms “that states with the initiative process have larger and more 
diverse interest group systems than states without the process.”292  In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, a state’s use of initiatives 
produces “a more politically self-confident and engaged electorate.”293  
Finally, empirical evidence supports the broader assertion that the use 
of direct democratic processes strengthens civic engagement overall.294 
In light of the this evidence, it is not unrealistic to think that the use 
of an opt-out system to provide information and funding for certain 
non-essential spending could produce similar benefits at the local level, 
even if they are smaller in scale and scope.  Indeed, experience from 
participatory local budgeting processes in Brazilian cities suggests that 
this might, indeed, be the case.295  Although the Brazilian processes are 
more robust and openly deliberative than the opt-out system, they 
nonetheless provide a useful vantage point from which to consider the 
potential civic benefits of direct democratic decision-making on matters 
of local spending.  In at least 103 Brazilian municipalities, constituents 
engage in regional meetings to set policy priorities and in neighborhood 
meetings to rank these priorities and then select specific projects for 
funding.296  Next, constituents elect delegates to present the results of 
their deliberative process, which include a budget proposal, to the city 
council for its consideration and adoption.297  Studies of this process have 
shown that it develops and sustains non-elite political activism in cities 
where it is employed.298  Furthermore, it has curtailed political patronage 
and altered the political culture by enabling constituents to make 
specific requests for public goods.299  Researchers have found significant 
 
291. Id. at 25, 34. 
292. Id. at 26. 
293. Id. at 27. 
294. Id. at 35. 
295. See William R. Nylen, Testing the Empowerment Thesis: The Participatory Budget 
in Belo Horizonte and Betim, Brazil, 34 COMP. POL. 127, 127 (2002) (describing participatory 
budgeting in Brazil and its effect on civic participation); Brian Wampler & Leonardo 
Avritzer, Civil Society and New Institutions in Democratic Brazil, 36 COMP. POL. 291, 291–92, 
299 (2004) (same). 
296. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 127; Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 299–300. 
297. Nylen, supra note 295, at 127; Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 300. 
298. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 140–41. 
299. Wampler & Avritzer, supra note 295, at 305–06. 
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spill-over of constituent participation into other social and political 
organizations, including notable increases in neighborhood associations 
and municipal councils.300  Finally, although data suggest that 
participatory budgeting in Brazil has done little to sustain political 
involvement of those who previously showed no interest in politics, it 
has provided an effective avenue of participation and lasting ancillary 
effects for those constituents who have at least some interest in local 
political outcomes.301 
Clearly, the opt-out system is not as deliberative as the Brazilian 
process, but it may nonetheless produce similar benefits, even if it does 
so to a lesser degree.  Like Brazilian participatory budgeting, an opt-out 
system allows constituents to voice an opinion on government spending 
outside of the representative or initiative processes, even if those 
constituents are not particularly politically active or part of the political 
elite.  In addition, it allows individual constituents to compare their 
opinion to those of their peers or to attempt to influence their peers.  It 
also empowers them, albeit in a lesser way than the Brazilian system, to 
exert some control over representative government’s spending 
priorities.  As a consequence, it may result in stronger civic participation 
among constituents, as is suggested by empirical literature on both the 
Brazilian process and on direct democratic processes used in the United 
States.  The combination of evidence from Brazil and from the states 
presents a strong case for adoption of an opt-out system at the local 
level as a form of beneficial constituent expression—one with the 
potential to increase civic participation and the perceived legitimacy of 
some local government spending. 
F.  Challenging a Pernicious Stereotype 
In addition to civic buy-in, local governments that adopt an opt-out 
system may receive a related benefit: weakening of the anti-tax 
American stereotype.  The opt-out system, because it would allow us to 
openly challenge our ingrained conception of the tax opposition of our 
fellow citizens, has the potential to change local communities for the 
better while producing positive externalities in the form of better 
political discourse and decision-making among constituents at the state 
and federal levels. 
 
300. See Nylen, supra note 295, at 133–34. 
301. Id. at 140. 
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As described in Part II, it is generally accepted that when asked to 
contribute to a store of public goods, people will behave cooperatively if 
they believe that others are doing the same.302  Likewise, if people 
believe that others are shirking, they will retaliate by withholding 
cooperation.303  Furthermore, when one person cooperates in response 
to another, her action may foster the cooperation of a third person, and 
so on.304  In light of these research results, the typical depiction of 
Americans—as characteristically opposed to taxation and the provision 
of public goods—is especially troubling.  If the results described above 
are generalizable, a particular constituent may vote against a tax levy or 
a spending item not because she is opposed to it, but because she 
believes that her neighbor is opposed to it. 
I posit that our anti-tax stereotype is sufficiently prevalent to affect 
individuals’ views on cooperation, and prevailing research suggests it 
contributes to a deleterious result.  One need not consult political vitriol 
to show that we, as a society, generally accept the premise that we are 
against tax and public distribution.  Scholars have written that most 
people are generally anti-tax and that anti-tax sentiment is “an intrinsic 
aspect of American patriotism and national character.”305  They have 
concluded that “tax laws seem capable of engendering nearly universal 
anger”; that “[f]or most Americans, any tax is a bad tax”; and that 
“perhaps the only thing that truly unites all Americans is a common 
perception of the Internal Revenue Service . . . as [an] enemy.”306  With 
such sweeping language, it is not difficult to see why constituents may 
hold negative views about others’ willingness to cooperate.  But if these 
statements are true, why do local tax measures sometimes pass?  If 
Americans are truly and rationally self-interested, why do they donate 
to charitable causes?  Although there may be a variety of answers to 
these questions, it simply cannot be the case that our entire society, or 
 
302. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–34 (describing empirical research on the 
subject). 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 339. 
305. Kornhauser, supra note 229, at 824–26. 
306. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and 
How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 157–58 (1996).  Professor Leo 
Martinez has seconded a portion of this sentiment, noting the amount of negative media 
coverage and political speech devoted to tax law and referring to the progressive income tax 
as “an unpopular foe.”  Leo P. Martinez, Tax Legislation and Democratic Discourse: The 
Rhetoric of Revenue and Politics, 4 NEV. L.J. 510, 510–12 (2004). 
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even a large portion of it, fits within the prevailing anti-tax stereotype. 
In localities where the opt-out system succeeded in producing 
provision of a public good, constituents would be faced with a challenge 
to the anti-tax stereotype and instead would be presented with a positive 
model for cooperation.  This change in available information may 
convince some people to abandon the stereotype for a more nuanced 
view of others’ attitudes about tax and spending.  Although the 
stereotype may persist nationally, information produced locally by an 
opt-out production of public goods should be more salient than 
information from broader sources because it relates to a constituent 
reference group.307  In addition, the information, which will relate to 
designated items of non-essential spending, will be more specific than 
media coverage of general anti-tax sentiment.  It will relate directly to 
the scope of local government and to individual constituents’ willingness 
to participate.  In that sense, it will be more analogous to experiments 
demonstrating individuals’ willingness to reciprocally cooperate.308  
Ideally, this should both increase constituents’ trust in one another and 
make them less likely to make assumptions based on the anti-tax 
stereotype. 
It is reasonable to posit that the cognitive benefit of challenging our 
anti-tax stereotype would spill over into other areas of direct democratic 
decision-making on taxes and spending.  If constituents are willing to 
cooperate with others to provide funds for non-essential spending that 
they favor, they should also be willing to cooperate with others to 
provide funds for essential spending that they favor.  In other words, 
constituents who work without the hindrance of an anti-tax stereotype 
should be more likely to consider tax and spending items on their merits 
in light of the willingness of others to do the same.  In contrast, those 
burdened by the stereotypical perception that all Americans are anti-tax 
may refuse to consider tax and spending issues on their merits due to a 
misperception about their neighbors’ willingness to cooperate.  If this is 
true, local governments’ adoption of an opt-out system could have the 
potential to change political discourse and decision-making 
substantively and for the better. 
 
307. For a discussion of the influence of reference groups, see supra Part II.D and the 
accompanying footnotes. 
308. See Kahan, Trust, supra note 78, at 333–34 (describing empirical research on the 
subject). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Direct democracy, both demonized and lionized, has been a 
controversial means of tax and expenditure decision-making since the 
early 1900s.309  Scholars have characterized it as a needed political check 
on representative government and as an unjust means of implementing 
tyranny of the majority or of special interests.310  In fact, this dichotomy 
is false; the outcome of direct democratic action need not be one or the 
other.  The drastic polarization of electoral results, and hence normative 
characterizations, may stem from the one time, all-or-nothing nature of 
existing initiative and referendum processes.311  Reimagining these 
processes in light of behavioral science’s challenge to classical economic 
theories may preserve the efficacy of direct democracy as a political 
check on tax and spending while reducing constituents’ tendency to 
overreach on specific issues as a means of expressing general 
dissatisfaction with the representative government.312 
The opt-out process of decision-making proposed in this Article is 
one such reimagining.  Rather than function in the all-or-nothing 
manner of existing direct democratic voting procedures, an opt-out 
system would allow voters to register proportional support over an 
extended timeline.  Specifically, local representative governments would 
choose to submit certain recurring non-capital, non-essential 
expenditures to proportional decision-making by constituents.313  All 
constituents would be presumed to support these expenditures unless 
they officially refused to pay.  Constituents could choose to opt out of 
payment at any time and for any reason.314  Allowing constituents the 
option of participating or withdrawing would create an inescapable form 
of political speech.315  Although not as consequential as decisions about 
essential spending, the ensuing result would provide information to 
representative governments about constituents’ perceptions of 
 
309. See generally Persily, supra note 71. 
310. See supra Part II.C. 
311. See supra Part V.B; Levmore, supra note 11, at 398 (noting that proportional tax 
voting allows the process to reach a result that corresponds proportionally to constituent 
enthusiasm). 
312. See supra Part V.B. 
313. See supra Part III.C. 
314. See supra Part III.C. 
315. See supra Part V.A. 
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governments’ permissible scope and role.316  In addition, an opt-out 
system would provide individual constituents with an important outlet 
for economically meaningful expression, as well as information about 
others’ preferences.317  Such a system has the potential to reduce tension 
in the constituent–representative government relationship by 
simultaneously creating a pressure valve for general constituent 
dissatisfaction and a means of constituent–representative government 
collaboration.318 
Old economic theories based on the storied rational actor predict 
that the opt-out system would fail as both a gauge of political will and as 
a means of raising revenue.319  Individuals acting self-interestedly would 
choose to opt out, free-riding on the contributions of others.320  As a 
result, the level of funding provided by an opt-out system would be 
minimal and would not reflect constituent preference.  But prevalence 
of the self-interested rational actor has been disproven by behavioral 
science.  In his place stands a constituent who gauges choices by not only 
personal preference, but also by reference to other constituents’ beliefs 
and actions.321  These empirical findings, debunking the myth of the 
rational actor’s prevalence, are confirmed by natural experiments on 
public goods decision-making in both Germany and Brazil.322  As a 
result, the opt-out process of decision-making by constituents need not 
be an academic fairy tale.  If structured properly, it could provide a 
useful avenue of political expression and an important source of 
information for constituents. 
As discussed more thoroughly above, providing this additional 
means of political expression, which creates new information, could 
produce a number of direct and ancillary benefits for local governments.  
First, by providing an outlet for general dissatisfaction, an opt-out 
process may reduce the likelihood of tax revolt.323  Stated more precisely, 
allowing a less drastic means of expression may spur more reasoned, 
 
316. See supra Part V.A. 
317. See supra Part V.A. 
318. See supra Part V.A. 
319. See supra Part II.D. 
320. See supra Part II.D. 
321. See supra Part II.D. 
322. See supra Parts III.A, V.E (discussing the German church tax and public budgeting, 
respectively). 
323. See supra Part V.B. 
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issue-specific voting by constituents on larger issues.  Second, 
implementing an opt-out process for the provision of some public goods 
would level the playing field for charitable providers by allowing them 
to compete for funds otherwise claimed by local government’s taxing 
power.324  Third, the opt-out process would create a limited form of non-
geographical Tiebout sorting, allowing constituents who are constrained 
in their ability to relocate to nonetheless shop for public goods to some 
extent.325  Finally, the opt-out process of decision-making has the 
potential to increase civic participation among constituents while 
simultaneously replacing a prevalent stereotype—that of the anti-tax 
American—with real and relevant information about individual 
constituents’ peer groups.326  If recent behavioral research is 
generalizable, constituent access to this information has the potential to 
change voting patterns.  Instead of voting against any provision of goods 
as a result of the perception that other constituents will not cooperate, 
individuals may instead consider such questions on their merits.327  
Viewed in this light, the opt-out process is a small change with big 
potential—the potential to improve democracy at the local level. 
 
324. See supra Part V.C. 
325. See supra Part V.D. 
326. See supra Part V.E. 
327. See supra Part V.F. 
